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Criminal Law
by Franklin J. Hogue*
and
Laura D. Hogue**

I.

INTRODUCTION

The Georgia Court of Appeals and Supreme Court produce a prodigious number of opinions in criminal cases every year. We reviewed 940
cases for this reporting period. We refrained from straying outside the
reporting period, even though one recent case of significance tempted us
greatly.1 Look for it in next year's review.
We are trial lawyers, so we organized this article in roughly the order
in which issues may arise in the average case. If no opinions of note
came out of the appellate courts in a given area of law, such as in the
area of bonds and pretrial release, we simply did not include a section
with that heading.

* Partner in the firm of Hogue & Hogue, Macon, Georgia. Atlanta Christian College
(B.A. magna cum laude, 1980); Emmanuel School of Religion (M.A. in theology, summa cum
laude, 1983); Georgia State University (M.A. in philosophy, summa cum laude,1988);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D. cum laude, 1991); Member, State
Bar of Georgia; Past-President, Macon Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers;
Sustaining Member, Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; Member, National
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers.
** Partner in the firm of Hogue & Hogue, Macon, Georgia. Columbus College (B.A.
cum laude, 1986); Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D. magna cum
laude, 1991); Member, State Bar of Georgia; Member, Georgia Association of Criminal
Defense Lawyers.

1.

Love v. State, 271 Ga. 398, 517 S.E.2d 53 (1999).
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PRETRIAL ISSUES

A.

Right to Counsel
The issue of one's right to counsel arises most often in misdemeanor
cases when defendants, following conviction in a pro se trial, appeal on
the grounds that the court denied their right to counsel. Waiver of
counsel requires a showing on the record that the defendant forfeited
this constitutional right knowingly and intelligently. 2 The court of
appeals reversed four convictions in this reporting period because the
record failed to show that these pro se defendants waived their right to
counsel.'
"When an accused is placed on trial for any offense, whether felony or
misdemeanor, for which [she] faces imprisonment, the constitutional
guarantee of right to counsel attaches. As with all constitutional
rights, the accused may forfeit this right by a knowing and intelligent
waiver. Waiver of counsel requires more than a showing of a knowledge of right to counsel; there must also be evidence of relinquishment"
of this right.4
The trial judge has a "serious and weighty responsibility" to protect
accused citizens "whose life or liberty is at stake" by insuring that they
know the perils of proceeding to trial without a lawyer.' The judge
must determine through a dialogue with the defendants that they
understand the risks and, in spite of them, desire to proceed without
counsel.' The burden shifts on appeal from the defendant to the state;
the state must "prove that the defendant received sufficient information
and guidance from the trial court upon which to knowingly and
intelligently relinquish this right."7 And when the record is silent,
waiver is never presumed.'

2. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83, 316 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1984); Smith v. State, 230
Ga. App. 151, 152, 495 S.E.2d 624, 625 (1998).
3. Deren v. State, 237 Ga. App. 387, 515 S.E.2d 191 (1999); Hamilton v. State, 233 Ga.
App. 463, 504 S.E.2d 236 (1998); Woods v. State, 235 Ga. App. 894, 510 S.E.2d 848 (1999);
Denson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 752, 516 S.E.2d 797 (1999).
4. Hamilton v. State, 233 Ga. App. 463, 465-66, 504 S.E.2d 236, 239 (1998) (quoting
Rutledge v. State, 224 Ga. App. 666, 669, 482 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1997)).
5. Id. at 466, 504 S.E.2d at 239 (quoting McCook v. State, 178 Ga. App. 276, 276-77,
342 S.E.2d 757, 758-59 (1986)).
6. See McCook, 178 Ga. App. at 277, 342 S.E.2d at 759.
7. 233 Ga. App. at 467, 504 S.E.2d at 240.
8. Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83, 316 S.E.2d 749, 751 (1984).
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Jeopardy

A reversal of a conviction by the appellate court rarely means that the
state cannot try the defendant again. One important exception,
however, arises when a prosecutor engages in misconduct "'intended to
subvert the protections afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause."' 9
Such misconduct occurred in Wilson v. State1° when the prosecutor
"improperly asked Wilson during cross-examination: 'Mr. Wilson, did
you try to negotiate a nolo contendere plea in this charge?""' While
the trial court did grant an immediate mistrial, it later denied defendant's plea in bar of double jeopardy when the State sought to retry
him. 2 The court of appeals reversed, finding it
impossible to believe that an error which is so blatant and so contrary
to the most basic rules of prosecutorial procedure and conduct could
have been simply a negligent act. To allow this prosecutor's action to
be categorized as a mistake would require this Court to assume that
this prosecutor was totally lacking the
foundational knowledge for
13
prosecutorial conduct in a courtroom.
Nevertheless, we wonder.'4

9. Wilson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 327, 329, 503 S.E.2d 924, 926 (1998) (quoting
Williams v. State, 258 Ga. 305, 312, 369 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1988)).
10. 233 Ga. App. 327, 503 S.E.2d 924 (1998).
11. Id. at 330, 503 S.E.2d at 926.
12. Id. at 329-30, 503 S.E.2d at 926.
13. Id.
14. In one other case of note concerning double jeopardy and mistrial, Akery v. State,
237 Ga. App. 549, 515 S.E.2d 853 (1999), the trial judge had previously informed counsel
that he would adjourn for the day at 5:00 p.m. At 4:55 p.m., while defense counsel was
conducting direct examination of his expert witness, the judge recessed for the day.
Defense counsel objected, informing the court that his expert witness had plans to leave
the country the following day. The judge recessed anyway. When court resumed the next
day, the expert witness was absent. Defense counsel presumed that he had kept his travel
plans. The State moved for mistrial because it had not yet cross-examined the witness.
The judge asked defense counsel for his position on the State's motion, to which counsel
responded that he had no position. The judge granted the mistrial. Id. at 549-50, 515
S.E.2d at 854.
When the case was called for retrial, the defense filed a plea in bar of double jeopardy.
The trial court denied the plea. Id. at 550, 515 S.E.2d at 854. The court of appeals
affirmed because defendant had not objected to the State's motion for mistrial and, in fact,
had acquiesced to it by his refusal to take a position on it. Id., 515 S.E.2d at 854-55.
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C. Demurrerand Motion to Quash
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that
O.C.G.A. section 40-6-275 was unconstitutionally vague. 5 This statute
requires drivers involved in a traffic accident on a multilane highway "to
move [their] vehicles out of harm's way unless the accident includes
personal injury, death, or extensive property damage."" Truck driver
Johnny Johnson collided with another driver on Interstate 85. The
crash rendered the other driver's car inoperable, but he was able to pull
it off the roadway. Johnson, however stopped his tractor-trailer in the
middle lane of the three-lane highway about two hundred feet up the
road from the disabled car and began to place warning markers behind
his truck. A pickup truck slammed into Johnson's truck, killing the
three occupants. Johnson was accused of vehicular homicide,7 predicated
upon his failure to comply with O.C.G.A. section 40-6-275.1
The supreme court ruled that the phrase "extensive property damage"
failed to withstand a vagueness attack because the statute did not "'so
definitely and certainly define the offense that a person of reasonable
understanding can know at the time of the commission of the act that
the law is being violated."' 18 The court reasoned that extensive
property damage could mean different things to different people:
Does the term 'extensive property damage' depend upon the quantity
of physical damage to a vehicle? If so, what percentage of the vehicle
must be damaged, ten percent, twenty percent, or fifty percent? Or
does the term depend upon the part of the vehicle which is damaged?
If so, must the damage be more than cosmetic; does damage to a
fender and door suffice; or must the damage be to a mechanical part?
Or, does the term 'extensive property damage' depend upon the cost of
repairs? If so, does the term mean the cost of repairs must exceed
$500, $1,000, or $5,000? Reasonable people will differ in their
approach to these questions-and the statute provides no answers. 9
The statute, therefore, had to be declared unconstitutional. °
In another case involving statutory construction, the court of appeals
held that the criminal abortion statute did not apply to a woman who

15. State v. Johnson, 270 Ga. 111, 111, 507 S.E.2d 443, 443-44 (1998).
16. Id. at 112, 507 S.E.2d at 444 (citing O.C.G.A. § 40-6-275(c) (1997)) (emphasis
added). O.C.G.A. section 40-6-275(c) has since been amended and no longer includes the
phrase "extensive property damage." See O.C.G.A. § 40-6-275(c) (Supp. 1999).
17. 270 Ga. at 111, 507 S.E.2d at 444.
18. Id. (quoting Bilbrey v. State, 254 Ga. 629, 631, 331 S.E.2d 551, 552 (1985)).
19. Id. at 112, 507 S.E.2d at 444.
20. Id. at 111, 507 S.E.2d at 444.
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caused the death of her near-term fetus by shooting herself in the
abdomen with a handgun.21 O.C.G.A. section 16-12-140(a) says:
Except as otherwise provided in Code Section 16-12-141, a person
commits the offense of criminal abortion when he administers any
medicine, drugs, or other substance whatever to any woman or when
he uses any instrument or other means whatever upon any woman
with intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion.2"
The court observed that "[t]his statute is written in the third person,
clearly indicating that at least two actors must be involved." 3 Because
the court must give statutory words their plain and ordinary meaning,
it followed that "O.C.G.A. [section] 16-12-140 does not criminalize a
pregnant woman's actions in securing an abortion, regardless of the
means utilized."24 Jacquelyn Aretha Hillman, therefore, committed no
crime under Georgia law; the trial court should have granted her motion
to quash the indictment.
In a case of first impression, the supreme court again expanded the
felony murder rule. 25 The court stated, "A person commits felony
murder when, while committing a felony, he or she causes the death of
another person, irrespective of malice. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(c). The
underlying felony must also be one that is dangerous per se; that is, its
26
attendant circumstances must create a foreseeable risk of death."
Defendant led police in a high-speed chase which ended when he collided
head-on with another car, killing its driver.2' The supreme court ruled
that felony fleeing and eluding a police officer, which results in the
death of another in a traffic accident, can serve as the underlying felony
to support a charge of felony murder. 8
A successful attack on a statute occurred in Powell v. State. 9 The
supreme court held that the sodomy statute, O.C.G.A. section 16-6-2,
infringes upon our constitutional right to privacy "insofar as it criminalizes the performance of private, unforced, non-commercial acts of sexual
intimacy between persons legally able to consent." ° Powell was
indicted for rape and aggravated sodomy of his wife's seventeen-year-old

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Hillman v. State, 232 Ga. App. 741, 744, 503 S.E.2d 610, 613-14 (1998).
O.C.G.A. § 16-12-140(a) (1999).
232 Ga. App. at 741, 503 S.E.2d at 611.
Id.
State v. Tiraboschi, 269 Ga. 812, 504 S.E.2d 689 (1998).
Id. at 812, 504 S.E.2d at 690.
Id.
Id.
270 Ga. 327, 510 S.E.2d 18 (1998).
Id. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26.
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niece. The niece testified that Powell "had sexual intercourse with her
and engaged in an act of cunnilingus without her consent and against
her will."3 1 Powell admitted the acts with his wife's niece, but testified
that she had consented. The trial court charged the jury on rape and
aggravated sodomy, but also charged the jury on the lesser offense of
sodomy. The jury acquitted Powell of rape and aggravated sodomy, but
found him guilty of sodomy.32 This verdict set up the attack on the
statute, because it meant the jury found the state had failed to prove
that the act of cunnilingus had been performed "'with force and against
the will' of the niece." 3 Therefore, the court had to decide whether the
statute authorized the State to intrude upon our right to engage in a
private consensual act of oral sex. The Court ruled it did not, thereby
throwing the State out of the bedroom.34

D. Discovery
In State v. Glenn,35 the court of appeals held that the state did not
waive its privilege to withhold the identity of a confidential informant
even though the state paid the informant.3 ' The trial court granted the
defense's request to reveal the informant's identity because the privilege
against revealing, the court reasoned, comes from a desire to protect
"upright citizens" who give information to the police, not "people who are
willing to sell, to market the information they have for a price."" In
reversing the trial court, the court of appeals noted that the privilege
belongs to the state, not the informant, and the state preserves its

31. Id. at 327, 510 S.E.2d at 20.
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-6-2(a) (1999)).
34. Id. at 336, 510 S.E.2d at 26. Other cases of note concerning demurrers and motions
to quash indictments include State v. Roberts, 234 Ga. App. 522, 507 S.E.2d 194 (1998)
(allowing defendant to be tried as party to the crime of child molestation and cruelty to
children, predicated upon her failure to act to prevent the molestation and cruelty, even
though the persons charged with directly committing the crimes were acquitted); Gamble
v. State, 235 Ga. App. 777, 510 S.E.2d 69 (1998) (providing no bar to prosecution pursuant
to O.C.G.A. section 17-7-53.1 if both prior indictments were not quashed as a result of
action by the defendant or the court); State v. Boyer, 270 Ga. 701, 512 S.E.2d 605 (1999)
(finding reckless conduct statute not unconstitutionally vague when applied to day care
worker accused of rough handling of a toddler); D'Auria v. State, 270 Ga. 499, 512 S.E.2d

266 (1999) (finding sexual battery accusation against a medical doctor failed to provide the
specificity necessary to apprise him of what he did in violation of the law); State v. Jackson,
271 Ga. 5, 515 S.E.2d 386 (1999) (finding disparity between statute that makes it a

misdemeanor to possess less than one ounce of marijuana and statute that makes it a
felony to purchase less than one ounce of marijuana survived equal protection challenge).
35. 236 Ga. App. 512, 512 S.E.2d 660 (1999).
36. Id. at 514-15, 512 S.E.2d at 662-63.
37. Id. at 514, 512 S.E.2d at 662.

1999]

CRIMINAL LAW

215

interest in withholding the identity of informers in order to encourage
the free flow of information about criminal activity even if the police pay
the informant."8
E. Continuance
Trial judges have broad discretion in granting or denying motions to
continue. During the past year, only three cases of interest arose in
connection with rulings on such motions.
In Brady v. State,39 though the evidence was sufficient to convict
James Lee Brady of statutory rape, incest, and child molestation, the
court of appeals reversed his conviction because the trial court denied
the defendant's motion to continue.4 ° The motion was based upon the
State's failure to provide defendant with a scientific report until four
days before trial rather than the ten days as required by O.C.G.A.
section 17-16-4(a)(4).41
In In the Interest of D.W,42 the trial court granted the State's oral
motion in the middle of trial to amend its petition to add a charge
against the juvenile in a juvenile delinquency hearing.' Georgia law
allows the State to amend a petition against a juvenile, but only if the
amended petition is served in accordance with O.C.G.A. sections 15-1126 and -27, which require personal service at least twenty-four hours
prior to the hearing." The juvenile court, in spite of these clear
statutes, denied the juvenile's motion to continue and found the juvenile
to be delinquent; the court sentenced him to five years, the first two to
be served in custody. 4' According to the court of appeals, this was clear
error requiring reversal.46
In a case concerned more with issues of criminal contempt and due
process, but arising out of a denial of a motion to continue, the trial
court found that two attorneys demonstrated contumacious behavior by
refusing to proceed with the trial of their client, Byron Barlow, who was
facing his third trial for rape after two mistrials.47 After two trials and
two hung juries, the court called one of the attorneys to tell him to
report for trial number three. The attorney appeared but filed a motion
38. Id. at 515, 512 S.E.2d at 662.
39. 233 Ga. App. 287, 503 S.E.2d 906 (1998).
40. Id. at 287-88, 503 S.E.2d at 907.
41. Id. at 288, 503 S.E.2d at 908.
42. 232 Ga. App. 777, 503 S.E.2d 647 (1998).

43. Id. at 777, 503 S.E.2d at 648.
44.

O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-26 to -27 (1999).

45. 232 Ga. App. at 777, 503 S.E.2d at 648.
46. Id. at 779, 503 S.E.2d at 649.
47. Barlow v. State, 237 Ga. App. 152, 513 S.E.2d 273 (1999).
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to continue, citing personal health reasons. He presented letters from
his doctor, but they did not specify that he was unable to try the case.
After a recess for the day, the attorney appeared in court, and the case
was called for trial. "During jury selection, [the attorney] insisted that
he could not go on due to his medical condition and then turned his back
on the jurors-conduct the court believed was a tactic to taint the
jury."4 The second attorney was called to appear in court to take over
the trial. He appeared but refused to proceed stating, "'With all due
respect to your honor, it would be my position if your honor forces me to
trial I would at every stage stand up and announce that I am unprepared to go forward, unwilling to go forward and not being able to
represent Barlow."'49 He introduced over four hundred pages of
documents to show that he had been occupied with another case and was
not prepared for Barlow's trial.5 °
The trial court found the two attorneys to be in criminal contempt and
sentenced them to ten days in jail and a $500 fine.5 The court of
appeals affirmed the contempt finding and the sentence, commenting
that the attorneys should have proceeded to trial and pursued their
appellate
remedies rather than "disobey a direct, lawful order of the
52
court."

F

Suppression
Alcohol, drugs, and automobiles combine to raise search and seizure
issues in hundreds of cases every year. Add a handful of search warrant
and confidential informant cases and suppression becomes one of the
most litigated areas of criminal law. This year was no exception. We
waded through them all with a view to selecting for review only those
cases in which the court applied the law to a novel set of facts-a rare
treat in suppression law-or cases in which the court distinguished a
new case from established cases on factual differences so slight that we
can be assured of seeing even more suppression cases next year.
1. Implied Consent Warning. In State v. Fielding,53 the court of
appeals held that a 1995 amendment to O.C.G.A. section 40-5-67.1
required police officers to read the implied consent warning "exactly as

48. Id. at 154, 513 S.E.2d at 276.

49. Id.
50. Id. at 153-54, 513 S.E.2d at 275-76.
51. Id. at 155, 513 S.E.2d at 276.
52. Id. at 156, 513 S.E.2d at 277.
53. 229 Ga. App. 675, 494 S.E.2d 561 (1997).
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set forth" in the Code section.54 Trial courts, for the most part, followed
this rule of strict compliance and granted motions to suppress and
motions in limine to exclude the results of breath tests in hundreds of
cases when police officers failed to recite the warning exactly as written
in the Code. Effective March 27, 1998, however, amended O.C.G.A.
section 40-5-67.1 now requires that the "notice shall be read in its
entirety but need not be read exactly so long as the substance of the
notice remains unchanged."" Following the rules that the court is
"obligated to apply the law as it exists at the time its opinion is
rendered"56 and "'where a statute governs only procedure of the courts,
including rules of evidence, it is to be given retroactive effect absent an
expressed contrary intention,"'57 the court of appeals reversed several
cases this reporting period in which the trial courts had excluded the
results of chemical tests of blood-alcohol content.58
Even though police no longer need to read the exact language of the
warning, they still cannot mislead anyone into thinking that she must
first post bond on the DUI charge before she can exercise her right to
the independent chemical tests referred to in the warning.59 Moreover,
the implied consent warning mentions drugs as one substance for which
the state will test; therefore, when requesting an independent blood test,
one cannot rely on a hospital consent form, which states the blood will
only be tested for alcohol, to argue that the State's use of the blood test
to prove the presence of drugs exceeded the scope of the consent.6" If,
after hearing the warning, a driver requests a second state-administered
breath test on the same intoxilyzer machine rather than the independent
blood test more commonly requested, the state must comply, even though

54. Id. at 677, 494 S.E.2d at 563.
55. O.C.G.A. § 40-5-67.1(b) (1997 & Supp. 1999).
56. State v. Nolen, 234 Ga. App. 291, 291, 508 S.E.2d 733, 734 (1998) (citing State v.
Martin, 266 Ga. 244, 245, 466 S.E.2d 216, 217 (1996)).
57. Id. at 292, 508 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting Polito v. Holland, 258 Ga. 54, 55, 365 S.E.2d
273, 273 (1988)).
58. See Nolen, 234 Ga. App. at 291, 508 S.E.2d at 734 (officer omitted the word "and"
when reciting the implied consent warning); State v. Mayo, 235 Ga. App. 107, 508 S.E.2d
475 (1998) (officer added "a" and "the" when reciting warning); State v. Moncrief, 234 Ga.
App. 871, 508 S.E.2d 216 (1999) (officer said "tests" instead of "test"); Rojas v. State, 235
Ga. App. 524, 509 S.E.2d 72 (1998) (officer added the word "an" before "additional chemical
tests"); State v. Black, 236 Ga. App. 56, 510 S.E.2d 903 (1999) (officer said "tests" instead
of 'test"); and State v. McGraw, 237 Ga. App. 345, 514 S.E.2d 34 (1999) (officer said "test"
instead of "tests").
59. State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248, 511 S.E.2d 608 (1999).
60. State v. Lewis, 233 Ga. App. 390, 504 S.E.2d 242 (1998).
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such a request is equivalent to buying a second copy of the newspaper
to check the accuracy of a story in the first copy."'
2. Roadblocks. In Workman v. State, 2 the court of appeals
examined "a screening officer's role in relation to the stop of a motorist
pursuant to a properly configured roadblock."63 Defendant approached
a roadblock while on her way home from a New Year's Eve party. A
screening officer, whose job was to divert to the side those drivers he
suspected of drinking and driving, smelled alcohol on defendant and
requested that she pull over, out of the flow of traffic. When she failed
the field sobriety tests administered by the investigative officer, he
placed her under arrest." The question before the court was whether
the diversion to the side of the road constituted a further seizure
requiring independent articulable and reasonable suspicion to support
it. Because the court answered "no," it overruled State v. Fischer65 to
the extent that it may be read to conflict with Workman.6
3. Plain View. The most significant plain view case of the reporting
period concerned whether an officer could conduct a warrantless search
upon seeing in plain view a piece of paper that a motorist attempted to
conceal between his legs as the officer stood at his window checking his
license and insurance.6 7 The paper contained cocaine, but the supreme
court held that the plain view exception to a warrantless search applied
only "where the incriminating character of the item is immediately
apparent" and, because the "piece of paper Brown dropped could not
immediately be seen to be incriminating," the officer was not authorized
to search it. 6" Brown's "furtive movement" in attempting to conceal the

61. Nawrocki v. State, 235 Ga. App. 416, 510 S.E.2d 301 (1998).
62. 235 Ga. App. 800, 510 S.E.2d 109 (1998).
63. Id. at 801, 510 S.E.2d at 111.
64. Id. at 800, 510 S.E.2d at 110.
65. 230 Ga. App. 613, 497 S.E.2d 79 (1998).
66. 235 Ga. App. at 804, 510 S.E.2d at 112-13. Two other notable roadblock cases
include State v. Manos, 237 Ga. App. 699, 516 S.E.2d 248 (1999) (roadblock impermissibly
based upon unfettered discretion of field officer when officer suspended the roadblock and
allowed cars through after traffic backed up and then resumed the roadblock when traffic
thinned out) and Davis v. State, 237 Ga. App. 890, 517 S.E.2d 115 (1999) (motorist may be
stopped when turning off roadway twenty to twenty-five yards from roadblock to avoid it
and happens to turn onto a dirt road with nothing on it but a chicken house where officers
reasonably presumed he did not live).
67. Brown v. State, 269 Ga. 830, 504 S.E.2d 443 (1998).
68. Id. at 831, 504 S.E.2d at 445-46.
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paper, moreover, did not change the object from an innocuous one to an
incriminating one.69
4. Consent. The Reagan-era anti-drug mantra "Just Say No" does
not seem to have found its way into the consciousness of motorists who
know full well that their vehicles or persons contain illegal drugs but
still say yes when asked by police officers for permission to search. Two
cases this year reveal, once again, the vast difference in results when
one motorist says yes and another says no to requests to search. In
Voyles v. State,7" defendant parked her van in a Wal-Mart parking lot,
got out, and encountered two drug investigators who asked her for
permission to search her van. She said yes; they found drugs; then she
complained on appeal that the officers had no reasonable suspicion to
stop her and ask to search her van.71 In language familiar from dozens
of cases, the court reminded Voyles:
There are three tiers of police-citizen encounters: (1) communication
between police and citizens involving no coercion or detention and
therefore without the compass of the Fourth Amendment, (2) brief
seizures that must be supported by reasonable suspicion, and (3)
full-scale arrests that must be supported by probable cause.72
The court placed Voyles's encounter in tier one.7" When she gave
consent, rather than walking away, she gave up her Fourth Amendment
protections.74
Contrast Voyles to Parker v. State,75 in which defendant received a
traffic warning, the officer told him he was free to leave, then the officer
asked Parker if he could search his car for drugs "just for the hell of it."
Parker said no, then had to wait while the officer called a drug dog to
the scene. After the dog alerted, the officers searched and found drugs,
and the trial court convicted Parker.7" However, the appellate court
reversed.77 When the traffic stop ended and Parker was free to leave,
the further question about searching occurred at tier one; Parker could
refuse, which he did, and leave, which he said he would like to do, but

69. Id., 504 S.E.2d at 446.
70. 237 Ga. App. 886, 517 S.E.2d 113 (1999).
71. Id. at 886, 517 S.E.2d at 113.
72. Id., 517 S.E.2d at 117 (quoting McClain v. State, 226 Ga. App. 714, 716, 487 S.E.2d
471, 473 (1997)).
73. Id. at 887, 517 S.E.2d at 117.
74. Id.
75. 233 Ga. App. 616, 504 S.E.2d 774 (1998).
76. Id. at 617, 504 S.E.2d at 775.
77. Id. at 619, 504 S.E.2d at 776-77.

220

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

the officer would not allow him to do so.7" The officer had nothing
more than a hunch to search, which, of course, violated Parker's Fourth
Amendment rights.Y
In another consent case, a neighbor tipped off the police that nineteenyear-old Jamie West was growing marijuana in his bedroom at his
parents' house, where he lived rent free. ° The police went over to have
a look. West was not home, but his mother told the police to go ahead
and search, saying that she wanted any drugs out of her house. The
trial court granted defendant's motion to suppress, reasoning that
because he kept the bedroom door locked, he had an expectation of
privacy and the police needed his consent to search.8 The court of
appeals reversed, ruling that a resident homeowner possesses the
authority to consent to a search of her entire home, "including an adult
child's bedroom which the homeowner permits the child to use for
free." 2 The authors wonder how much rent would have produced a
different outcome? Furthermore, what if West "paid" his rent in
household chores?
5. Search Warrants. In a rare reversal of a search warrant case,
the court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress in which defendant argued that the affidavit provided by the
officer to the magistrate failed to mention that the informant was
"enraged" at defendant when he provided the information.83 It seems
defendant had expressed a romantic interest in the informant's "old
lady." 4 The informant had a healthy criminal history, which included
some probation and parole problems looming over him, and he had asked
the officer for "help" on his pending DUI charge in exchange for the
tip.85

These omissions denied the magistrate "the opportunity to

accurately assess the informant's reliability and veracity."86

78. Id. at 617, 504 S.E.2d at 775.
79. In a "first tier" case, the court ruled that a brief encounter in a drug area justified
the brief stop and inquiry of Gonzalez, but because Gonzalez did not raise the issue, the
court left unanswered whether this tier justified the police ordering Gonzalez to open his
mouth and lift his tongue, under which he had several pieces of crack cocaine. Gonzalez
v. State, 235 Ga. App. 253, 255, 509 S.E.2d 144, 146 (1998).
80. State v. West, 237 Ga. App. 185, 514 S.E.2d 257 (1999).
81. Id. at 185, 514 S.E.2d at 257.
82. Id. at 186, 514 S.E.2d at 258.
83. Robertson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 68, 510 S.E.2d 914 (1999).
84. Id. at 69, 510 S.E.2d at 915.
85. Id. at 68-69, 510 S.E.2d at 915.
86. Id. at 69, 510 S.E.2d at 915.
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Garmon v. State87 produced a detailed analysis by the court, along
with a strong dissent, of a situation in which the police stopped a citizen
who drove away from a house for which the police had obtained and
were about to execute a search warrant."8 Relying on United States
Supreme Court cases Michigan v. Summers"s and Terry v. Ohio,s° as
well as the unique facts of this case, the court concluded that
it was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments for the officers, knowing that Wilson's premises were to
be the subject of the immediate execution of a search warrant, to
detain temporarily the vehicle containing Garmon in order to identify
the occupants and see if one of them was the person they had just
overheard discussing gambling and drugs on the phone."

The court described the detention as "minimally intrusive" and not an
"arbitrary and capricious exercise of police power."92

6. Protected Areas. In State v. Gallup,93 the court of appeals held
that a refrigerator is a protected area, which could not be legally
searched, at least on the peculiar facts of this case.' Someone vandalized eighty-three storage units during the night, leaving the door to each
one hanging open. The next day, investigators surveyed the damage,
looking in storage units for items that would identify the owners. One
investigator entered defendant's storage unit, which contained a fourwheeler, a desk, and a refrigerator. When the investigator failed to spot
anything that identified the owner, he opened the refrigerator, thinking
he might find a prescription bottle with a person's name on it. Instead
he found thirty pounds of marijuana. He closed the refrigerator and
reported his discovery; then another officer obtained a search warrant.9 5 Affirming and quoting the trial court, the court of appeals ruled
that
opening the refrigerator by Inspector Vick was a search, i.e., a quest for
information by a state agent, that "was not supported by a warrant[,
nor] based on a plain view observation from a lawful vantage point

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

235 Ga. App. 671, 510 S.E.2d 350 (1998).
Id. at 672, 510 S.E.2d at 352.
452 U.S. 692 (1981).
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
235 Ga. App. at 676, 510 S.E.2d at 354.
Id.
236 Ga. App. 321, 512 S.E.2d 66 (1999).
Id. at 323, 512 S.E.2d at 69.
Id. at 322, 512 S.E.2d at 68.
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[because that act exceeded] the scope of his legitimate presence within
Unit 61."9
7. Laser Speed Detection. Izer v. State,97 a speeding ticket case
decided February 5, 1999, drew a quick response from the Legislature.
The court in Izer reversed the trial court for admitting evidence of speed
based upon a laser gun without any evidence from the State to establish
its reliability.98 A mere seven weeks later the Governor approved a
bill, effective March 25, 1999, which says:
Evidence of speed based on a speed detection device using the speed
timing principle of laser which is of a model that has been approved by
the Department of Public Safety shall be considered scientifically
acceptable and reliable as a speed detection device and shall be
admissible for all purposes in any court, judicial, or administrative
proceedings in this state. A certified copy of the Department of Public
Safety list of approved models of such laser devices shall be self-authenticating and shall be admissible for all purposes in any court,
judicial, or administrative proceedings in this state."
The authors expect several challenges to this statute in the coming year.
III.

EXTRINSIC ACT EVIDENCE: SIMILAR TRANSACTIONS

We have rarely encountered a prosecutor who declines to use against
a defendant so-called "similar transaction" evidence when it can be
found. Just as rare is the judge who disallows its use. It constitutes one
of the most pernicious weapons in a prosecutor's arsenal and "creates a
high risk of a jury reaching a verdict on an improper basis, i.e., because
the accused has bad character or committed some bad act in the
past."'0°
The trend is to continue expanding the use of similar
transaction evidence, not to limit it.
The leading case of the year in this area is State v. Belt.'' The
court of appeals reversed the trial court for failing to give a limiting
instruction, at the time the extrinsic act evidence was admitted, even
though no request to give the instruction was made. 0 2 The supreme
court granted certiorari to answer the question:
"Whether it is

96. Id.
97. 236 Ga. App. 282, 511 S.E.2d 625 (1999).
98. Id. at 283-84, 511 S.E.2d at 627-28.
99. O.C.G.A. § 40-14-17 (Supp. 1999).
100. State v. Hinson, 269 Ga. 862, 862, 506 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1998) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting). See also EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE, at
ix (1998); PAUL S. MILICH, GEORGIA RULES OF EVIDENCE, § 11.1 (1995).
101. 269 Ga. 763, 505 S.E.2d 1 (1998).
102. Belt v. State, 227 Ga. App. 425, 425, 489 S.E.2d 157, 158 (1997).
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reversible error for a trial court, absent a request, to fail to instruct a
jury that similar transaction evidence admitted for a limited purpose
must be considered only for the limited purpose for which it was
admitted." °3 The supreme court answered "no," despite saying that it
would be the better practice to do so, and reversed the court of appeals."'

The authors question whether limiting instructions ever produce the
intended salutary effect of causing jurors to refrain from doing the very
thing the instruction is designed to prevent-using the extrinsic evidence
to conclude that an accused person committed this crime because the
accused is a bad person.10 5 We hope to see the law in this area begin
to restrict the admissibility of such evidence. 06 To that end, defense
lawyers should never fail to greet every notice of the State's intent to
introduce extrinsic act evidence with the best arguments against it. For
excellent discussions of such evidence we recommend the dissent by
Justices Benham, Fletcher, and Sears in State v. Belt' °7 and sources
cited by Justice Fletcher in State v.Hinson.'
How old can the extrinsic act be before the trial court must exclude it?
In Fields v.State,0 9 the court found twenty-six years was not too

103. State v. Belt, 269 Ga. at 763, 505 S.E.2d at 1.
104. Id. at 765, 505 S.E.2d at 2.
105. A similar transaction charge can cause confusion and produce an unfair trial when
expanded in an impermissible way. See Rivers v. State, 236 Ga. App. 709, 513 S.E.2d 263
(1999).
106. One of the permissible purposes for admitting extrinsic evidence, for example, is
"bent of mind." It is difficult to see how "bent of mind" does not amount to propensity or
character evidence, which everyone concedes is an impermissible method of convicting a
person. Consider this holding: In Lucas v.State, 234 Ga. App. 534, 507 S.E.2d 253 (1998),
which is not especially unusual, the State introduced as a "similar transaction" a videotape
of a prior DUI arrest involving defendant. Id. at 536, 507 S.E.2d at 256. The court held:
Evidence of a prior DUI offense, regardless of the circumstances surrounding its
commission, is logically connected with a pending DUI charge as it is relevant to
establish that the perpetrator has the bent of mind to operate a motor vehicle
when it is less safe for him to do so.
Id. It would be difficult for a jury to view extrinsic evidence like this and then not think
that the defendant is guilty in the case before them because he is the kind of person to
drive under the influence.
107. 269 Ga. at 765, 505 S.E.2d at 2.
108. 269 Ga. at 862, 506 S.E.2d at 871 (Fletcher, J., dissenting). See also IMWINKELREID, supra note 94, at ix; MILICH, supra note 94, at § 11.1. For other cases following Belt
and Hinson, see Turner v. State, 235 Ga. App. 331, 508 S.E.2d 786 (1998); Mobley v. State,
235 Ga. App. 151, 508 S.E.2d 778 (1998); Murphy v. State, 270 Ga. 72, 508 S.E.2d 399
(1998).

109. 233 Ga. App. 609, 504 S.E.2d 777 (1998).
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old."' However, in 7yson v. State"' twenty-seven years was too
old.12 The court reversed Tyson's conviction, citing Gilstrap v.
State,"' which held evidence that was thirty-one years old was too
remote." 4 Extrinsic act evidence is admissible even if the prior crime
being introduced was reversed on appeal." 5 A certified copy of a prior
conviction for the same crime as the one for which the defendant 6 stands
trial is not sufficient to be introduced as a similar transaction."
IV. SPEEDY TRIAL

Three cases of interest arose this period concerning demands for trial.
In George v. State"7 the issue on certiorari to the supreme court was
"whether a demand for speedy trial filed in a state court case is effective
in a term during which no jurors that have been summoned to serve in
state court are impaneled, but during which jurors summoned to serve
in superior court are impaneled.""' The answer:
Because the plain language of O.C.G.A. [section] 15-12-130 provides
that jurors summoned to serve in superior court are only qualified to
serve in state court if the requirements of [section] 15-12-130(b) are
satisfied, we hold that a demand for speedy trial is not effective during
a term such as that described above unless the requirements of
subsection (b) are satisfied." 9

110. Id. at 610, 504 S.E.2d at 779. The court cited Gibbons v. State, 229 Ga. App. 896,
899, 495 S.E.2d 46, 50-51 (1997), which held twenty to twenty-nine years was not too

remote.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
232 Ga. App. 732, 503 S.E.2d 640 (1998).
Id. at 732, 503 S.E.2d at 641.
261 Ga. 798, 410 S.E.2d 423 (1991).
Id. at 799, 410 S.E.2d at 424.

115. Grant v. State, 237 Ga. App. 892, 894, 515 S.E.2d 872, 874 (1999).
116. Sheffield v. State, 237 Ga. App. 701, 702, 516 S.E.2d 563, 565 (1999).
117. 269 Ga. 863, 505 S.E.2d 743 (1998).
118. Id. at 863, 505 S.E.2d at 744.
119. Id. at 863-64, 505 S.E.2d at 744. The statute states:
(b) Subsection (a) of this Code section shall be applicable only if:
(1) At the time the names of trial jurors are drawn by the judge of the superior
court in accordance with Code Section 15-12-120, the judge who draws the jurors
shall announce in open court the name or names of the court or courts other than
the superior court wherein the jurors shall be competent and qualified to serve by
virtue of this Code section;
(2) The precept issued by the clerk of the superior court in accordance with Code
Section 15-12-65 shows that the jurors listed thereon are qualified and competent
to serve as jurors in courts other than the superior court and shows the name of
such court or courts; and
(3) The summons served upon or sent to each of the jurors pursuant to Code
Section 15-12-65 affirmatively shows the name of all the courts wherein the juror
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Applying the balancing test established in the United States Supreme
Court case of Barker v. Wingo, 12 1 the court of appeals held that a
thirty-month delay in prosecuting a defendant accused of DUI did not
require dismissal on grounds that the delay violated defendant's
constitutional right to speedy trial. 1 '
A final case establishes no new rule, but reminds us that a Uniform
Traffic Citation filed in the state court clerk's office triggers the accused
person's right to demand a speedy trial.'22
V.

DEATH PENALTY CHALLENGES

David Perkins lost his bid in the Georgia Supreme Court to reverse his
sentence of death by electrocution.123 Perkins attempted to show that
the Clayton County district attorney's office discriminated against him
because he is a male, claiming that the district attorney only seeks the
death penalty against men. Perkins showed that the Clayton County
grand jury had indicted seventy-three men and eleven women for
murder between 1985 and 1995, and had sought the death penalty
against nine of those men and no women.' 24 The supreme court was
unmoved by these "meager statistics," concluding that they failed to
show "selective prosecution because they do not provide any evidence
specific to his own case that support an inference that gender considerations played a part in the district attorney's decision to seek the death
penalty against him."12
In another Clayton County case, the supreme court reversed David
Phillip Smith's conviction for murder and possession of a firearm during
the commission of a felony and his sentence to death. 126 According to
the supreme court, the trial judge committed several errors. First, she
refused to allow evidence of two incidents involving the victim, which
occurred two days before the fatal shooting, when, according to the
supreme court, these incidents were relevant to Smith's claim of
justification. 27 Next, the trial judge refused to allow the defense to
impeach a State's witness with prior inconsistent statements until they

is eligible to serve.
O.C.G.A. § 15-12-130(b) (1999).
120. 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
121. Thomas v. State, 233 Ga. App. 224, 226, 504 S.E.2d 59, 62 (1998).
122. Hayek v. State, 269 Ga. 728, 729-30, 506 S.E.2d 372, 373-74 (1998).
123. Perkins v. State, 269 Ga. 791, 505 S.E.2d 16 (1998).
124. Id. at 794, 505 S.E.2d at 19.
125. Id.
126. Smith v. State, 270 Ga. 240, 240, 510 S.E.2d 1, 4. (1998).
127. Id. at 242-44, 510 S.E.2d at 5-6.
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Prior inconsistent statements,
were introduced into evidence. 2
however, need not be admitted into evidence in order to be used for
impeachment.'2 9 In .yet another ruling limiting the defendant's right
to a thorough and sifting cross-examination, the trial judge refused to
allow defendant to impeach a witness who alleged that defendant had
made a racial slur about the victim by showing that the witness himself
was racist and that he had made the slur.'13 Then the trial judge
would not allow the defendant to testify that he, a Caucasion man, had
dated an African-American woman, which would have tended to show
that he was not the type of person who would have uttered the racial
slur.1' Lastly, the prosecutor caused error by arguing to the jury that
their sentence would be reviewed by "those even after you," a possible
allusion to the appellate court, leading the jury to believe that the
responsibility for their sentence lay elsewhere." 2
In the final death penalty case of note for this reporting period, the
supreme court reversed the death penalty for William Kenny Stephens,
whose case presented an unusual procedural twist. 3' The jury voted

for Stephens's death in 1980. In 1988 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the death sentence because
Stephens's lawyer failed to explore mitigating evidence of Stephens's
mental problems. Upon retrial of the sentencing phase in 1989, the jury
again voted for death."' The Georgia Supreme Court reversed because
the standard of proof to be applied to the question whether Stephens had
proved mental retardation-an issue to be proved in the guilt-innocence
phase of the trial-had been reduced by the Legislature in 1988 from
beyond a reasonable doubt, which the court applied in the 1989
sentencing retrial, to preponderance of the evidence, which will apply on
Stephens's third sentencing trial."5
VI.

GUILTY PLEA

State,"6

the supreme court ruled that a preprinted form
In King v.
used in a guilty plea hearing in which the defendant received a sentence
of imprisonment did not constitute an adequate record for appellate

128. Id. at 244-45, 510 S.E.2d at 6-7.
129. Id. at 245, 510 S.E.2d at 7 (citing Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 568, 492
S.E.2d 201, 202-03 (1997)).
130. Id. at 245-46, 510 S.E.2d at 7-8.
131. Id. at 246, 510 S.E.2d at 8.
132. Id. at 247, 510 S.E.2d at 8.
133. Stephens v. State, 270 Ga. 354, 354, 509 S.E.2d 605, 608 (1998).
134. Id., 509 S.E.2d at 607.
135. Id. at 356-57, 509 S.E.2d at 609-10.
136. 270 Ga. 367, 509 S.E.2d 32 (1998).
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review. 3 7 The court ordered that state courts must now produce a
verbatim record of guilty plea
hearings when the defendant receives a
3 8
sentence of imprisonment.

In Lawrence v. State,' even though the defense and the State
recommended a sentence to the court that they considered to be fair, the
trial court disagreed, saying that the sentence was too lenient. The
court imposed the maximum sentence.'4 ° The problem arose, however,
because the court did not make it clear to defendant that she had a right
to withdraw her guilty plea before it imposed the higher sentence.'
The court informed the parties, prior to hearing evidence, that it would
reject the recommended sentence because it was too lenient, but then
told defendant to "go ahead and present your evidence and call your
witnesses or whatever you want to do," leading defense counsel to
believe that he still had some chance to persuade the judge to accept the
recommendation."' He was sorely mistaken; the court imposed the
maximum. 4" The court of appeals decided that this case "exemplifie[d]
the need for a bright line test."'
The trial court should follow the
clear dictates of Uniform Superior Court Rule 33. 10,145 which are not

optional.' 4 "The consequences are too severe to allow vague statements or implication to supplant the definitive requirements articulated
by the Supreme Court of Georgia and court rules." 47
VII. PROBATION REVOCATION
In another case originating in Rockdale County Superior Court, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's revocation of Hernan Villa

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at 369-70, 509 S.E.2d at 35.
Id. at 372, 509 S.E.2d at 36-37.
234 Ga. App. 603, 507 S.E.2d 490 (1998).
Id. at 603, 507 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 604, 507 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 605, 507 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 603, 507 S.E.2d at 491.
Id. at 605, 507 S.E.2d at 492.
Id. at 603-04, 507 S.E.2d at 491. Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.10 provides as

follows:
If the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement, the trial court shall, on the
record, inform the defendant personally that (1) the trial court is not bound by any
plea agreement; (2) the trial court intends to reject the plea agreement presently
before it; (3) the disposition of the present case may be less favorable to the
defendant than that contemplated by the plea agreement; and (4) that the
defendant may then withdraw his or her guilty plea as a matter of right. If the
plea is not then withdrawn, sentence may be pronounced.
146. 234 Ga. App. at 605, 507 S.E.2d at 492.
147. Id.
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Sanchez's probation because the trial judge had no authority to impose
as a condition of probation that Sanchez leave Georgia and return to
Mexico and later revoke his probation when the court found out that he
had not yet left the state. 14 The original sentence of banishment from
the state violated a fundamental law of our state constitution 149 and
the order to return to Mexico exceeded the trial court's authority,
encroaching into deportation laws, which are the sole province of the
federal government.15 °

VIII.

JURY SELECTION

As seems to be the case every year, the appellate courts considered
several cases in which jury selection formed the central issue, almost all
of them spawned by Batson v. Kentucky. 5' Because the principles of
Batson apply equally to the defense as well as to the prosecution,' 52 an
African-American defendant can no more exercise peremptory strikes in
a discriminatory way against Caucasion jurors than can the State
against the defendant by striking African-American jurors.
"To evaluate claims that the state or defendant used peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial court must
engage in a three-step process. The opponent of a peremptory
challenge must make a prima facie showing of racial discrimination;
the burden of production shifts to the proponent of the strike to give a
race-neutral reason for the strike; the trial court then decides whether
the opponent of the strike has proven discriminatory intent."53
Applying this test in Crawford v. State,' the court of appeals affirmed
the trial court's conclusion that defense counsel based two of his eleven
strikes against
Caucasion jurors on racial grounds and replaced them on
5
the jury.15
The defendant in Burton v. State56 failed to show discriminatory
intent when the State struck an African-American juror who attended
a church that protested against the police and the district attorney's

148. Sanchez v. State, 234 Ga. App. 809, 809, 508 S.E.2d 185, 186 (1998).
149. GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 21.
150. 234 Ga. App. at 809, 508 S.E.2d at 186. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(3) (1998).
151. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
152. Ellerbee v. State, 215 Ga. App. 312, 315, 450 S.E.2d 443, 447 (1994).
153. Crawford v. State, 233 Ga. App. 323, 325, 504 S.E.2d 19, 22 (1998) (quoting
Chandler v. State, 266 Ga. 509, 510, 467 S.E.2d 562, 564 (1996)).
154. Id. at 323, 504 S.E.2d at 19.
155. Id. at 324-25, 504 S.E.2d at 22-23.
156. 233 Ga. App. 429, 504 S.E.2d 279 (1998).
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office.' 57 A special concurrence and a dissent in this case took issue,
however, with the form of the analysis taken by the majority, arguing
that the majority had in effect added a fourth condition to the three-part
test, an inquiry into whether "the trial court's decision based upon
whether the opponent proved the race-neutral reason was not really
neutral." 5 ' As in most Batson-like cases, the analysis is in-depth and
requires close reading. The concurrence noted that such analysis has
caused many trial courts to fear reversal in this area of law, and, in fact,
reversals have become routine, along with lengthy majority opinions,
special concurrences, and heated dissents.'59
IX.

OPENING STATEMENTS

Darien Alexander and Rodriquez Hartry were tried together for
murder.' 60 The jury convicted them both. But, in a four to three
decision, Alexander's conviction was reversed while Hartry, who raised
the same issue on appeal, saw his conviction affirmed. 16' In both cases
the supreme court considered whether comments made by the prosecutor
in opening statement rendered the jury's verdict questionable. In
Alexander, the answer was "yes;" in Hartry, "no."' 62
The district attorney told the jury in opening that he would show that
the drive-by shooting, which killed a man who was standing on a porch,
was gang-motivated, a retaliation for an earlier confrontation. But at
trial he failed to offer any such evidence. Counsel for Alexander moved
for a mistrial, which the court denied.'63 The supreme court ruled that
the mistrial should have been granted because the prosecutor never
made any showing to support his opening statement and made no
defense of his failure to provide such evidence, which led the court to
conclude that his remarks during opening were not made in good

157. Id. at 430, 504 S.E.2d at 280-81.
158. Id. at 431, 504 S.E.2d at 281 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially). Id. at 434-36,504

S.E.2d at 283-85 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
159. 233 Ga. App. at 431-32, 504 S.E.2d at 282-83 (Eldridge, J., concurring specially).
See also Ridley v. State, 235 Ga. App. 591, 510 S.E.2d 113 (1998); Hinson v. State, 237 Ga.
App. 366, 515 S.E.2d 203 (1999).
160. Alexander v. State, 270 Ga. 346, 509 S.E.2d 56 (1998); Hartry v. State, 270 Ga.
596, 512 S.E.2d 251 (1999).

161. Alexander, 270 Ga. at 351, 509 S.E.2d at 61; Hartry, 270 Ga. at 600, 512 S.E.2d
at 255.
162. Alexander, 270 Ga. at 348-51, 509 S.E.2d at 59-61; Hartry, 270 Ga. at 597-600,512
S.E.2d at 253-55.
163. Alexander, 270 Ga. at 348-49, 509 S.E.2d at 59.
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faith."6 Hartry's case differed because of overwhelming evidence that
he pulled the trigger that fired the fatal bullet.'65
X.

A.

STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF

Elements of the Crime
The State's failure to meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable

doubt every element of the crime, despite jury verdicts of guilty, caused
66
several reversals. The most significant case was State v. Collins.1
The defendant was convicted of rape, statutory rape, and incest
involving a twelve-year-old girl. The court of appeals affirmed the
convictions of statutory rape and incest, but reversed the rape conviction,
holding that the State must be required to prove the element of force in
a rape conviction, regardless of the age of the victim. 16 7 The supreme
court granted certiorari to consider whether the element of force may be
presumed as a matter of law to obtain a rape conviction when the victim
is a minor. Relying upon Drake v. State, 8' the supreme court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.' 69 The court explained
that the rape statute requires the State prove that the act of carnal
knowledge be committed "forcibly" and "against the will" of the
victim.' v In cases of young victims, the fact that the victim is under
the age of consent may supply the "against her will" element but the fact
of the victim's age "cannot supply the element of force as a matter of law
in rape cases."' 7 '
The holding did not come easily. The majority noted several opinions
between Drake and Collins which had denigrated the holding of Drake
to such a degree that it would have authorized the court to reconsider
the requirement of force in rape of children.' 72 The majority, nevertheless, chose to reaffirm its holding rather than presume force based upon
The court found the rationale in Drake to be
the victim's age.'

164. Id. at 349-50, 509 S.E.2d at 60.
165. Hartry, 270 Ga. at 599, 512 S.E.2d at 254.
166. 270 Ga. 42, 508 S.E.2d 390 (1998).
167. 229 Ga. App. 658, 658, 495 S.E.2d 59, 61 (1997).
168. 239 Ga. 232, 236 S.E.2d 748 (1977).
169. Collins, 270 Ga. at 42, 508 S.E.2d at 390.
170. Id. at 42-43, 508 S.E.2d at 390-91.
171. Id. at 43, 508 S.E.2d at 391.
172. Id. See Cooper v. State, 256 Ga. 631, 352 S.E.2d 382 (1987); Richardson v. State,
256 Ga. 746, 353 S.E.2d 342 (1987); Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178 (1997).
Cooper was overruled on November 1, 1999 by Brewer v. State, No. $99G0864, 1999 WL
983007, at *2 (Ga. Nov. 1, 1999).
173. 270 Ga. at 43, 508 S.E.2d at 391.
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persuasive; if force were presumed by a victim's age, there would be
virtually no need for the crime of statutory rape.' 74 The court also
noted that as the legal age of consent has increased, it has become
necessary in rape cases to distinguish between different categories of
underage girls; the kindergartner and the sexually active high-schooler,
for example.175 Additionally, the court pointed out that the quantum
of evidence to prove force against a child is minimal because intimidation may be substituted for force.17
Justice Hines, concurring, expressed confidence that prosecutors would
act reasonably in choosing to indict between the crime of rape and
statutory rape, if the element of force were abandoned.'7 7 Justice
Hunstein dissented, arguing that the majority's holding was contrary to
the Legislature's stated intention "to increase the protection afforded by
law to the children of this State," 78 by making it "extremely difficult"
for the State to obtain rape convictions for those who assault very young
or very abused children.179 She attacked the Drake holding, stating
that severing the proof necessary to satisfy the two elements of "forcibly"
and "against her will" 80 was "clever lawyering, but poor law" and
noting that in Whitaker v. State' and Gore v. State'8 2 the presumption of "constructive force" was granted to victims who are physically or
mentally incapable of giving consent, while Drake limited that principle
to helpless adult victims, not children.8 3 Finally, Justice Hunstein
attacked the majority's concern that, without so holding, the crimes of
statutory rape and rape would in effect merge."8 She noted that the
statutory rape statute "was intended to apply only to cases where the act
of intercourse is accomplished with the actual consent or acquiescence
of the female, and is to be treated as rape merely because the female is
under the age of consent as therein fixed."8 5

174. Id. at 43-44, 508 S.E.2d at 391.
175. Id. at 45, 508 S.E.2d at 392.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 46, 508 S.E.2d at 393 (Hines, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 50, 508 S.E.2d at 395 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 49, 508 S.E.2d at 395.
180. Id. at 53, 508 S.E.2d at 398.
181. 199 Ga. 344, 34 S.E.2d 499 (1945).
182. 119 Ga. 418, 46 S.E. 671 (1904).
183. Collins, 270 Ga. at 49, 508 S.E.2d at 394 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 51, 508 S.E.2d at 396-97. But see the distinction between the rape and
aggravated sodomy law. In Brewer v. State, 236 Ga. App. 546, 512 S.E.2d 30 (1999), the
trial court instructed the jury that
[a] person commits the offense of aggravated sodomy, when he commits sodomy
with force and against the will of the other person. A child under the age of
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In other types of cases, the State's proof failed to satisfy the necessary
elements of the indicted offense. A conviction for the misdemeanor
offense of converting payments for real property improvements was
reversed when the court of appeals determined that the crime required
proof of specific intent to defraud.18 Thompson was hired to do stucco
work; he made arrangements with Yearty to purchase the materials.
Yearty purchased the materials and delivered them to Thompson, but
Thompson withheld payment for the supplies, claiming that he was
setting off a previous debt Yearty owed him.187 The court of appeals
reversed the conviction, holding that the State bears the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson had the specific
intent to defraud as defined by the statute.'
It takes more than one's opinion to convict someone of possession of
marijuana. 189 In Adkinson v. State,9 ° defendants argued successfully for the reversal of their convictions on the crime of possession of
marijuana with intent to distribute because there was no chemical
analysis of the green, leafy material found in their car.'9 ' Both the
detective and a GBI chemist testified that they thought the material was
marijuana, but as the chemist testified, he did not test it.' 92 The court
of appeals found that, as a matter of law, this belief did not constitute
sufficient evidence for the conviction to stand.'
In the area of DUI law, the court of appeals has dealt with challenges
to the admission of inspection certificates to prove that the breath test
machines were in proper condition. In Jackson v. State,"4 a case of
first impression, the court held that the self-authenticating provision of
O.C.G.A. section 40-6-392(f) is constitutionally valid; therefore,
introduction of the certificate of inspection does not require proof of the

fourteen years is legally incapable of consenting to sexual contact. In cases of
incapacity, such as with a child under the age of fourteen years, the element of
force is automatically supplied by the law.
Id. at 547, 512 S.E.2d at 31. Citing previous case law, the court distinguished the
necessity for a showing of force to prove aggravated sodomy on a child from the necessity
for the force element in the rape of a child, as dictated by State v. Collins, 270 Ga. 42, 508
S.E.2d 390.
186. Thompson v. State, 233 Ga. App. 792, 792, 505 S.E.2d 535, 536 (1998).
187. Id.
188. Id. at 793, 505 S.E.2d at 536. See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-15(a) (1999).
189. See Adkinson v. State, 236 Ga. App. 270, 511 S.E.2d 527 (1999).
190. 236 Ga. App. 270, 511 S.E.2d 527 (1999).
191. Id. at 271, 511 S.E.2d at 529.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 233 Ga. App. 568, 504 S.E.2d 505 (1998).
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business records exception elements dictated by O.C.G.A. section 24-314.'
In Andries v. State,'98 the holding was extended to allow the
State to meet its burden by introduction of noncertified copies of
inspection certificates.'97 The court of appeals found that had the
Legislature intended for O.C.G.A. section 40-6-392(f)
to require certified
198
copies, it would have expressly provided so.
In traffic cases, the State may not satisfy its burden of proving venue
merely by introducing the Uniform Traffic Citation ("UTC"). ss In
Graves v. State, °° the defendant unsuccessfully appealed his convictions for traffic violations to the court of appeals.2"' The supreme
court granted certiorari to consider whether the court of appeals
correctly determined that the City of Atlanta Traffic Court took judicial
notice of venue by the conclusion that the UTCs, upon which the traffic
prosecution was based, indicated that the offenses were committed in
Fulton County. The supreme court concluded that the UTC is not
evidence and "cannot provide the factual predicate necessary to establish
venue."" 2 The supreme court further ordered that "henceforth, if a
trial court intends to take judicial notice of any fact, it must first
announce its intention to do so on the record, and afford the parties an
opportunity
to be heard regarding whether judicial notice should be
20 3
taken."
B.

Hearsay

In the state's case in chief, the most common hearsay exceptions will
be the necessity exception and res gestae-the latter used primarily for
the purpose of introducing hearsay from police officers to explain their
conduct.
To satisfy the requirements of the necessity exception to the hearsay
rule, the state must show unavailability of the witness and the
reliability of the out-of-court statement. When the state's witness,
usually the victim, is dead, the first tier of unavailability is, of course,
satisfied. The reliability of that statement, however, must still be shown
in order for it to be properly admitted. In Chapel v. State,0 4 state-
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197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 571, 504 S.E.2d at 508.
236 Ga. App. 842, 512 S.E.2d 685 (1999).
Id. at 844-45, 512 S.E.2d at 687.
Id.
Graves v. State, 269 Ga. 772, 504 S.E.2d 679 (1998).
227 Ga. App. 628, 490 S.E.2d 111 (1997).
Id. at 628-29, 490 S.E.2d at 112-13.
269 Ga. at 772, 504 S.E.2d at 680.
Id. at 775, 504 S.E.2d at 682.
270 Ga. 151, 510 S.E.2d 802 (1998).
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ments made by the murder victim to three of her friends regarding her
plans to meet with defendant and the purpose for their meeting were
properly admitted by the trial court. °5 But in Azizi v. State,2°6
hearsay statements made by the deceased victim to her lover were not
admissible because they were inherently unreliable.0 7 The victim's
lover testified that the deceased victim had told him that Azizi abused
and neglected her and told her that he would kill her if she left him.20 8
The supreme court held that the admission of these statements
constituted reversible error because "[a] married person's complaints
about that person's spouse, made to one with whom the married person
is conducting an adulterous affair, are subject to the possibility of
exaggeration if not outright falsehood."0 9
The statements of witnesses given to police are often tendered through
the police officer under the res gestae exception to the hearsay
rule-ostensibly to explain the officer's conduct. This exception has its
limitations. In Harrisonv. State,21 ° a husband and wife were tried and
convicted in a joint bench trial. The officer testified that when he
arrived, defendants, their children, and two of defendants' parents were
at their home. Both defendants had minor injuries and both told the
officer that they had been involved in a dispute and had each struck the
other although they both blamed the other for striking the first blow.
Both defendants were arrested and, when called at their joint trial,
invoked the marital privilege to avoid testifying against the other. After
the officer testified to both their statements the night of the arrest, the
court found both defendants guilty of battery.2 '
The Harrisons appealed, citing as error the admission of the officer's
hearsay testimony because the State failed to demonstrate the need for
the testimony.2 2 The court of appeals agreed, noting as pivotal the
fact that there were two other adult witnesses at the house on the night
of the arrest who, for no known reason, were never interviewed or called
as witnesses.2"' The convictions were reversed.1 4

205.
206.
207.

Id. at 154-56, 510 S.E.2d at 806-07.
270 Ga. 709, 512 S.E.2d 622 (1999).
Id. at 712, 512 S.E.2d at 626.

208. Id.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Id. (citing Carr v. State, 267 Ga. 701, 705-06, 482 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1997)).
238 Ga. App. 485, 518 S.E.2d 755 (1999).
Id. at 485, 518 S.E.2d at 757.
Id.
Id. at 485-86, 518 S.E.2d at 758.
Id. at 489, 518 S.E.2d 760.
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In Weems v. State, 15 the supreme court found the admission of the
police officer's hearsay testimony in defendant's murder trial erroneous,
yet affirmed the conviction, holding that the error was harmless in light
of the eyewitness identification of defendant as the shooter.216 The
investigating detective testified at trial that a police "canvass" of the
area where the shooting took place resulted in the discovery "that a
possible suspect was Fernando."2 17 When defense counsel made a
hearsay objection to the testimony, the trial court allowed the testimony
because it explained the officer's conduct.218 In finding error, the court
noted as follows:
"It is most unusual that a prosecution will properly concern itself with
why an investigating officer did something." Stated another way,
unless it is the rare instance in which the conduct of an investigating
officer is a matter concerning which the truth must be found, it is error
to permit an investigating officer to testify, under the guise of
explaining the officer's conduct, to what other persons related to the
officer during the investigation.219
C. Intent
In July 1998 the Georgia Supreme Court faced identical issues in their
review of two different murder cases-the admissibility of fictional
movies as proof of the defendant's intent. In both instances, the
introduction of this evidence was approved by the majority, which drew
a strong dissent by Justices Fletcher, Benham, and Sears.
In Rushin v. State,22 ° defendant was being tried for the murder of a
Worth County convenience store employee. The State introduced as
evidence a videotape of the movie entitled Menace H Society because
defendant had viewed it at least six times and often spoke of his favorite
character, "O-dog." The portion of the videotape played to the jury
showed "O-dog" brutally shooting store clerks during a convenience store
robbery and, as Rushin had done, taking the store's surveillance
videotape. The trial court instructed the jury that the introduction of

215. 269 Ga. 577, 501 S.E.2d 806 (1998).
216. Id. at 579-80, 501 S.E.2d at 808-09.
217. Id. at 578, 501 S.E.2d at 808. Weems, the defendant, was identified as "Fernando"
by a witness at trial. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 578-79, 501 S.E.2d at 808 (citing Teague v. State, 252 Ga. 534, 536, 314
S.E.2d 910, 912 (1984)).
220. 269 Ga. 599, 502 S.E.2d 454 (1998).
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the film was "for the limited purpose of any bearing on the221defendant's
bent or state of mind at the time of the incident on trial."
Defendant alleged error in the introduction of the film because it was
an improper attack on his character.2 22 The supreme court disagreed,
holding that defendant's "fascination" with the film and his having
copied the conduct in the film made it relevant to the question of his
bent of mind.223
The dissent disagreed, asserting that the prejudicial effect of showing
a fictitious film outweighed the probative value of the evidence. 22 4' The
dissent argued that the "real purpose" of the introduction of the film was
to present a "clear and colorful image" of two brutal murders. 225 And
generated by the movie
despite the limiting instruction, the impressions
22 s
would be particularly difficult to limit.

In Beasley v. State,227 defendant was tried and convicted for a
Toombs County murder. During the trial, the State played for the jury
the entire film NaturalBorn Killers. Beasley had watched the movie at
least nineteen times, told people he wanted to be like the characters in
the movie, and sometimes referred to himself by the names of characters
in the movie. The movie depicts a violent murder, rape, kidnapping, and
prison mutiny.22s The movie was allowed into evidence, without
limiting instructions, to show Beasley's bent of mind.229
Again, the dissent strongly disagreed, arguing that the prejudicial
effect of misleading the jury by blurring the distinction between Beasley
and the fictional character on film greatly outweighed any probative
value of the movie.23 °
D. Expert Witnesses
In cases of sexual abuse, the state may not offer expert testimony
which bolsters the victim's statements. In Thompson v. State,23 ' the
trial court erred in allowing the State's expert witness in a molestation,
statutory rape, and incest case "to relate her conclusion that the victim's
allegations of sexual abuse were credible and that the victim's actual

221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 600, 502 S.E.2d at 456.
Id. at 600-01, 502 S.E.2d at 456.
Id. at 601, 502 S.E.2d at 456.
Id., 502 S.E.2d at 457 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
Id. at 603, 502 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
269 Ga. 620, 502 S.E.2d 235 (1998).
Id. at 622, 502 S.E.2d at 238.
Id.
Id. at 626, 502 S.E.2d at 241 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
233 Ga. App. 364, 504 S.E.2d 234 (1998).
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descriptions of sexual activities including those with defendant were not
discounted as inaccurate."" 2 The court concluded, nevertheless, that
because the fact of the child's sexual abuse was not controverted-the
defense conceded that the child had been abused by many people but he
was not one of them-the error did not likely contribute to the verdict.233
In a similar case, Parrish v. State,2" defendant was found guilty of
rape. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State
to present an expert witness who had not examined defendant or the
victim to testify about the profile of a typical abuser and the effects of
such abuse on victims (the battered person syndrome). The evidence
was introduced because, through argument and cross-examination of the
victim, the defense sought to show that the victim had means and
opportunity to seek help during the time period she claimed she was
being held by defendant.235
The court of appeals held the testimony regarding battered person
syndrome was relevant and admissible to rebut Parrish's defense
because the expert testified that failure to make an outcry made sense
within the profile of a battered woman.2 3' However, the court agreed
with defendant that the testimony regarding the profile of an abuser was
not properly admitted because it improperly placed defendant's character
in issue. 7 Given the "overwhelming evidence" of defendant's guilt,
the court held it was highly probable that the error did not contribute
to the verdict and affirmed the conviction.238
Lewis v. State239 appears to be one prosecutor's attempt to circumvent the backlogged GBI crime lab. The State prosecuted defendant for
possession of cocaine with neither a crime lab expert nor a stipulation
to the identity of the drug. The State simply called upon the police
officer to testify that he conducted a field test on the substance
confiscated from defendant and that the test results identified the
substance as cocaine. On appeal, defendant argued that the trial court
erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal because the
field test results did not constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt that
In reversing Lewis's conviction, the
the substance was cocaine."
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Id. at 364, 504 S.E.2d at 234-35.
Id. at 365, 504 S.E.2d at 235.
237 Ga. App. 274, 514 S.E.2d 458 (1999).
Id. at 276, 514 S.E.2d at 462.
Id. at 276-77, 514 S.E.2d at 462-63.
Id. at 277, 514 S.E.2d at 463.
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233 Ga. App. 560, 504 S.E.2d 732 (1998).
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court held an expert witness is required. 2 1 The dissent disagreed,
noting that the reliability of the field test would be tested by defense
the jury would determine the appropriate weight
cross examination and
242
to afford such a test.
E.

Statements of Codefendants

The state's introduction of statements of nontestifying codefendants
continues to clash with the defendant's right to confront and crossexamine witnesses who testify against him. In Hanifa v.State 43 and
Kirk v. State2 " the supreme court held that redacted statements of
nontestifying codefendants violated the Confrontation Clause; nevertheless, the error was harmless. 245 The statements of the nontestifying
codefendants admitted into evidence identified Hanifa by nickname as
a person at the scene of the crimes and as an active participant in the
initial assault of the victim. Her participation after the initial assault
was described as having been done by "someone" or "others" or "they,"
while her co-indictees who were not on trial with her were identified by
name."46 While the number of participants in the crimes made it less
clear that the generic terms referred to Hanifa, the jury was notified by
the use of the terms and by the deletions on the typewritten statements
that a name had been redacted, making the statements similar to
Bruton's unredacted confessions 247 and ita constitutional violation.
Following the lead of the U.S. Supreme Court, we hold that, unless the
statement is otherwise directly admissible against the defendant, the
Confrontation Clause is violated by the admission of a nontestifying
co-defendant's statement which inculpates the defendant by referring
to the defendant's name or existence, regardless of the existence of
limiting instructions and of whether the incriminated defendant has
made an interlocking incriminating statement. A co-defendant's
statement meets the Confrontation Clause's standard for admissibility
when it does not refer to the existence of the defendant and is
accompanied by instructions limiting its use to the case against the
confessing co-defendant. The fact that the jury might infer from the
contents of the co-defendant's statement in conjunction with other
evidence, that the defendant was involved does not make the admission
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Id. at 561-62, 504 S.E.2d at 734-35.
Id. at 563, 504 S.E.2d at 735-36 (Ruffin, J., dissenting).
269 Ga. 797, 505 S.E.2d 731 (1998).
Id. The supreme court consolidated these two cases for review.
Id. at 801, 505 S.E.2d at 736.
Id. at 804, 505 S.E.2d at 738.
See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
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of the co-defendant's statement a violation of the Confrontation
Clause.248
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the error was not sufficiently
harmful to authorize reversal of her convictions because of the other
overwhelming evidence of her guilt.249
An interesting twist to the Confrontation Clause mandate occurred in
Alexander v. State250 when the prosecuting attorney called Alexander's
co-indictee, Tucker, to the stand. Tucker had previously entered a guilty
plea to the indicted crime of armed robbery, but when he took the stand
he invoked his right to remain silent. He was granted immunity and
received numerous contempt adjudications; nevertheless, he refused to
testify. Over defendant's objection, the prosecuting attorney was
permitted to ask Tucker a series of leading questions that suggested the
answers sought, thus inculpating Alexander.2 5'
The court of appeals found that the trial court erred in permitting the
prosecutor to question Tucker in that manner because such testimony
"serves to abrogate a defendant's fundamental right to confront, question
and secure answers from his accusers."252 Nevertheless, the court did
not reverse because it found the error harmless due to the overwhelming
evidence of guilt.25
F

Limiting Cross-examination

The trial practitioner should take note of some types of crossexamination that are properly forbidden. In Golden v. State,254 defense
counsel attempted to cross-examine a State witness-who had testified
about a fact differently than a previous State witness-by asking the
second witness if her testimony would change if she knew that the first
witness had "sat in that very witness chair" and testified in a certain
way.255 The State objected, arguing that the witness could not comment on evidence presented outside her presence.2 56 The trial court
sustained the objection, and the court of appeals affirmed the ruling,

248. 269 Ga. at 803-04, 505 S.E.2d at 738.
249. Id. at 804, 505 S.E.2d at 738. See also White v. State, 270 Ga. 804, 514 S.E.2d 14
(1999) (making the same finding but also holding that the error did not mandate reversal
of the conviction).
250. 236 Ga. App. 142, 511 S.E.2d 249 (1999).
251. Id. at 143-44, 511 S.E.2d at 251-52.
252. Id. at 144-45, 511 S.E.2d at 252.
253. Id. at 146, 511 S.E.2d at 253.
254. 233 Ga. App. 703, 505 S.E.2d 242 (1998).
255. Id. at 703, 505 S.E.2d at 243.
256. Id.
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holding that the effect of the question would be to compel the witness to
comment on the veracity of the prior witness's testimony, which is an
improper function of a witness.257
However, it is always proper for the defense to cross-examine a state
witness about any sentencing advantage she acquired by agreeing to
testify for the state and entering a plea to a lesser offense.2 5 In
Massaline v. State,259 the trial judge refused to allow defense counsel
to cross-examine the State's witness in this manner.2" The court of
appeals, relying upon Byrd v. State,26 ' held that the trial court abused
its discretion in refusing to allow such a cross-examination.2 62 Neverbecause of the other "overwhelming
theless, the conviction was affirmed
263
evidence of defendant's guilt."

Note, however, that in Kenney v. State2 the Georgia Court of
Appeals allowed a trial court to limit such a cross-examination of an
accomplice or state witness to the possible maximum sentence he faced
while prohibiting an inquiry into mandatory minimum sentences.265
G. Directed Verdict of Acquittal
In Burke v. State,26 defendant was charged with driving under the
influence to the extent that he was a less safe driver and for making an
improper left turn. At the close of evidence, the trial court directed the
jury to enter a verdict of guilty on the improper turn charge. 267 The
court of appeals reversed.26
XI.

DEFENDANT'S CASE IN CHIEF

A.

Justification
In a victory for the defense, the court of appeals in Hammond v.
State269 reversed a conviction for voluntary manslaughter, aggravated
assault, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during the
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Id.
Massaline v. State, 234 Ga. App. 35, 36-37, 506 S.E.2d 181, 183 (1998).
234 Ga. App. 35, 506 S.E.2d 181 (1998).
Id. at 35, 506 S.E.2d at 182.
262 Ga. 426, 420 S.E.2d 748 (1992).
Massaline, 234 Ga. App. at 37, 506 S.E.2d at 183.
Id.
236 Ga. App. 359, 511 S.E.2d 923 (1999).
Id. at 360, 511 S.E.2d at 925.
233 Ga. App. 778, 505 S.E.2d 528 (1998).
Id. at 778, 505 S.E.2d at 529.
Id.
233 Ga. App. 613, 504 S.E.2d 768 (1998).
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commission of a crime, holding that the trial court erred in excluding
evidence that two months prior to the shooting, the victim threatened to
kill defendant.270 Hammond and his wife were separated; his wife
stayed in the marital residence with the children. After his wife began
a relationship with the victim, Hammond sought a court order prohibiting the victim from spending the night in the home with Hammond's
children.271
One evening, Hammond called the home to talk with his children and
heard the victim's voice. A confrontation between Hammond and his
wife ensued. After that, the victim called Hammond and cursed at him.
The victim, over the wife's protests, stormed out of the house toward
Hammond's trailer, located just a few hundred yards from the wife's
house. The victim reached Hammond's driveway and called out for him.
Hammond walked outside carrying a shotgun with the barrel pointed
toward the ground. Evidence conflicted over how the killing happened,
but the shotgun went off and the victim died.272
The trial court applied Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.6, governing
evidence of prior violent acts of the victim, to the evidence that the
victim had threatened to kill Hammond two months before this shooting.
Because the defense did not provide notice pursuant to the Rule, the
The court of appeals reversed, holding that
court excluded it.27
evidence of a terroristic threat does not constitute evidence of a prior
violent act and, therefore, does not require the notice dictated by
Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.6.274 Because evidence of the threat
27
was crucial to the defense, the trial court's error required reversal. 1
The holding in Hammond, however, was superseded a few months
later by the supreme court's ruling in Owens v. State,276 which
removed entirely the notice requirements of Uniform Superior Court
Rule 31.6 from those acts between the victim and defendant when a
prima facie case of justification is established.27 7 Owens is an offshoot
of Wall v. State.278 In Wall, the supreme court ruled that the State
could introduce evidence of prior difficulties between the defendant and
the victim without the notice requirements of Uniform Superior Court

270. Id. at 615, 504 S.E.2d at 770.

271. Id. at 614, 504 S.E.2d at 769.
272. Id. at 614-15, 504 S.E.2d at 769.

273. Id. at 615, 504 S.E.2d at 770.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276.

270 Ga. 199, 509 S.E.2d 905 (1998).

277. Id. at 201-02, 509 S.E.2d at 907-08.
278.

269 Ga. 506, 500 S.E.2d 904 (1998).
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Rule 31.1 and 31.3(b)."' Relying upon the principle that due process
requires "'a balance of forces between the accused and his accuser,'" the
supreme court in Owens applied the holding in Wall to remove the notice
requirements on the defense for evidence of prior difficulties between the
victim and defendant."' As a result, Owens's murder charge was
reversed because the trial court prohibited her from introducing evidence
that when the victim, her husband,
drank, he became aggressive toward
21
her by waving his gun in the air.
The appellate courts gave the justification defense additional review
during this reporting period. In Nguyen v. State, s2 defendant sought
to introduce evidence of the battered person syndrome in support of her
justification defense. Thu Ha Nguyen was a Vietnamese woman who
was living with her husband and her husband's daughter. She was
accused and convicted of having shot both her husband and stepdaughter. In support of her claim of battered person syndrome, Nguyen
conceded that she was not physically abused but claimed that both her
husband and stepdaughter had been verbally abusive, disrespectful, and
unkind toward her.283
The court of appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court prohibiting
evidence and a charge of battered person syndrome in the absence of any
2
evidence of actual or attempted violence committed by the victims. 1
The court of appeals was constrained to follow supreme court authority
holding that verbal threats alone, unaccompanied by actual or attempted
violence, cannot authorize reliance upon the battered person syndrome. 5
Nguyen was also denied the opportunity to present evidence from a
political scientist specializing in Asian culture to testify about differences
between Asian and American cultures, in further support of her claim
of justification.28 8 Nguyen contended that the expert's testimony was
necessary for the jury to understand her reaction to her husband's and
stepdaughter's behavior because conduct that incited fear in her might
not have incited fear in a person born and raised in the United
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Id. at 507-09, 500 S.E.2d at 906.
Owens, 270 Ga. at 201, 509 S.E.2d at 908.
Id. at 199, 509 S.E.2d at 906.
234 Ga. App. 185, 505 S.E.2d 846 (1998), affd on othergrounds, Nguyen v. State,
475 (1999).
Id. at 185, 505 S.E.2d at 847.
Id. at 186, 505 S.E.2d at 847-48.
Id., 505 S.E.2d at 848 (citing Chester v. State, 267 Ga. 9, 10, 471 S.E.2d 836, 837
Id.
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States.2"' The court of appeals also rejected this argument, finding
"the fact that verbal threats or verbal abuse might justify the use of
deadly force in some cultures is not relevant to whether the use of such
force is justified under Georgia law."288
However, in the period following the court's opinion in Nguyen, the
Georgia Supreme Court held in Mobley v. State 8 9 that evidence
reflecting a pattern of psychological abuse is a factor in determining if
a self-defense claim based on the battered person syndrome has been
established.29 ° Relying on Mobley, the supreme court in Nguyen v.
State2 9' overruled the court of appeals, holding that psychological
abuse can warrant the introduction of expert evidence on the battered
person syndrome if the abuse is "of such an extreme nature that it
engendered in the accused a 'reasonable belief in the imminence of the
victim's use of unlawful force.'"292 Because the defendant's evidence
of psychological abuse did not rise to
the requisite level, the court
2 93
affumed the exclusion of the evidence.
In Brown v. State," the question arose whether defendant was
entitled to present evidence of justification, as well as have the jury
charged on this defense, when the factual basis of the justification was
Brown's belief that the victim was molesting his five-year-old daughter.
The victim, Clarkson, was married to Brown's former wife.295 Brown
admitted killing Clarkson but contended that he was justified in doing
so because Clarkson was molesting his daughter. The State filed a
motion in limine to exclude any evidence of the alleged molestation. The
trial court granted the motion, finding that an act of molestation,
without a showing of the use or threat of physical force, is not a forcible
felony for which the defense of justification would be available.296 In
an interlocutory appeal, however, the supreme court held that child

287. Id.
288. Id.
289. 269 Ga. 738, 505 S.E.2d 722 (1998).
290. Id. at 740, 505 S.E.2d at 723.
291. 271 Ga. 475 (1999).
292. Id. at 475-76 (quoting Smith v. State, 268 Ga. 196, 199, 486 S.E.2d 819, 822
(1997)).
293. Id. at 476.
294. 270 Ga. 601, 512 S.E.2d 260 (1999). This appeal arose after the supreme court
remanded this action to the trial court. See Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 154, 486 S.E.2d 178

(1997).
295. There is a discrepancy in the two Brown supreme court cases regarding the name
of the victim. The earlier interlocutory appeal refers to the victim as Jeff Clark. See
Brown, 268 Ga. at 154, 486 S.E.2d at 178. The latter appeal refers to the victim as Jeffery
Clarkson. See Brown, 270 Ga. at 601, 512 S.E.2d at 260.
296. Brown, 268 Ga. at 155, 486 S.E.2d at 179.
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molestation is, by its very nature, a forcible and violent crime, thereby
reversing the trial court's ruling.29 7 The case was remanded to give
Brown the opportunity to show that Clarkson's alleged acts supported
a justification defense pursuant to Chandler v. State.29
At the hearing, however, the evidence showed that Brown had stalked
the victim for some time and shot him as he stood in the yard. The child
was not even present. Under these circumstances, the trial court held
that the evidence of Clarkson's molestation was not admissible because
Brown's daughter was not in imminent danger of being molested by
Clarkson. 2 Absent any other evidence of justification, the trial court
was authorized to refuse Brown's charge on justification. 3°° The
supreme court affirmed Brown's conviction for malice murder, holding
that "[olnly if Brown acted in accordance with the legally recognized
exculpatory motive of justification, rather than revenge, would evidence
of Clarkson's bad character and specific acts of violence be admissible on
Brown's behalf."30 1 In refusing Brown's charge on justification, the
court avoided what Chief Justice Benham had previously referred to in
the Chandler case as "trial by character assassination."3"2
Chief
Justice Benham wrote, "When applied to homicide cases ... this
revolutionary change in the law of evidence is a throwback to frontier
days and gives judicial sanction to a new defense to murder: the victim
'needed killing."' 3 3
Justice Hunstein dissented, arguing that if motive for a killing is
always a relevant and appropriate inquiry for the state, then fairness
dictates that the defendant should, likewise, be permitted to introduce
evidence relating to motive. 304 She noted:
The object of all legal investigation is the discovery of truth ....The
jury in this case determined Brown's guilt totally oblivious to the
reasons why Brown killed Clarkson. That those reasons did not legally
vindicate the killing does not justify leaving the jury blindfolded and
ignorant. The erroneous omission of this evidence calls into question
the fundamental fairness of Brown's trial, particularly in regard to the
editing of Brown's statement to the police, a redaction which deprived

297. Id.
298. Brown, 270 Ga. at 601, 512 S.E.2d at 262 (citing Chandler v. State, 261 Ga. 402,
407, 405 S.E.2d 669, 673 (1991)).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 603, 512 S.E.2d at 263.
301. Id. at 602, 512 S.E.2d at 262.
302. Id. at 602-03, 512 S.E.2d at 263 (citing Chandler, 261 Ga. at 409, 405 S.E.2d at
674 (Benham, J., concurring specially)).
303. Chandler, 261 Ga. at 409, 405 S.E.2d at 674 (Benham, J., concurring specially).
304. Brown, 270 Ga. at 606, 512 S.E.2d at 265 (Hunstein, J., dissenting).
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the jury of the context essential for the jury to determine the "true
drift, intent and meaning of what was said."0 5
In Casillas v. State, °6 the trial court prohibited the introduction of
evidence of the victim's prior reckless acts in support of the defense that
the killing had been an accident. It was undisputed that on the night
of the shooting, Casillas, his friend Ruiz, and the victim, Wright, who
was in a wheelchair, had been drinking beer and watching a tape about
combat Rangers. Casillas began to talk about his combat experience,
and Wright told him that he did not believe his stories. Casillas went
to his bedroom and brought out a pistol and bag of ammunition. Wright,
who was paralyzed from the waist down, "jokingly" said that he would
rather be dead because he was no longer able to have intercourse.
Casillas "jokingly" placed the gun in Wright's mouth. Ruiz testified
that
3 °7
he took the pistol from Wright and took all the rounds out of it.
As the evening wore on and the beer ran out, Casillas and Wright got
into an argument. According to Ruiz, Wright was being "kind of
obnoxious" and told Casillas to put the pistol back in his mouth. Ruiz
testified that he saw Casillas reload the gun and point it at the victim
while standing about three to four feet away but did not see the gun
being fired. Wright was shot once in the center of his forehead.3 8
Ruiz and Casillas tried to take Wright to the hospital but his "body
fell out of the wheelchair and fell down the flight of stairs."3 9 Casillas
eventually called the police. Before they arrived, Casillas told Ruiz to
say that the victim had shot himself. The spent shell casing, however,
was located across the room from where Wright had been shot.3 10
Casillas's custodial statement matched Ruiz's testimony except that
Casillas adamantly denied reloading the gun. He agreed that he had
pointed the gun at Wright but insisted that he made certain that it was
pointed a safe distance away from his head and that when he squeezed
the trigger, he believed the gun was empty.31 "It was an accident,"
Casillas insisted, "[wie were just trying to show [the victim] a good time,
'cause he was crippled, you know.'" 12

305. Id. at 606-07, 512 S.E.2d at 265 (citing Smalls v. State, 105 Ga. 669, 671, 31 S.E.
571 (1898)).
306. 233 Ga. App. 752, 505 S.E.2d 251 (1998).
307. Id. at 752-53, 505 S.E.2d at 253.
308. Id. at 753, 505 S.E.2d at 253.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 754, 505 S.E.2d at 254.
312. Id.
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At trial, there was additional conflicting testimony about who
unloaded and reloaded the gun. Both Ruiz and Casillas testified that
Wright was reaching for the gun at the time it went off. The jury
acquitted Casillas of murder but found him guilty of involuntary
manslaughter during the commission of an unlawful act of reckless
conduct. 13
Casillas sought to introduce the testimony of a police officer that on
several previous occasions Wright had been found intoxicated and sitting
in his wheelchair in the middle of the road. This prior reckless conduct
of the victim, Casillas argued, supported his defense that3 1Wright
may
4
have acted in a way to cause his own death on this night.
The court of appeals ruled that the exclusion of this evidence was not
error. 315 Moreover, even if the ruling was erroneous, it was not
harmful because the jury had heard a great deal of other evidence about
that night that proved the victim was acting recklessly. 316 Justice
McMurray dissented, stating that he believed Casillas was entitled to
introduce evidence of the victim's pattern of reckless behavior while
under the influence of alcohol and that the exclusion of such evidence
mandated reversal of the conviction.317
B.

Expert Witnesses
The Georgia Supreme Court unequivocally paved the way for attacks
on the manner in which alleged child victims are interviewed by the
police or social workers in Barlow v. State.31' Timothy Barlow was
convicted of two counts of child molestation. He appealed, enumerating
as error the trial court's refusal to permit him to introduce expert
evidence attacking the techniques used by a police detective in a
videotaped interview of the victim. The court of appeals affirmed.319
In a case of first impression in Georgia, the supreme court granted
certiorari to consider the exclusion of the expert testimony proffered by
Barlow. The court concluded as follows:
[S]uch testimony involves an area of expertise beyond the ken of the
average layman and, therefore, [ I the defendant in a child molestation
case is entitled to introduce expert testimony for the limited purpose

of providing the jury with information about proper techniques for

313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Id. at 755, 505 S.E.2d at 254.
Id. at 755-56, 505 S.E.2d at 254-55.
Id.
Id. at 756, 505 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 758, 505 S.E.2d at 257 (McMurray, J., dissenting).
270 Ga. 54, 507 S.E.2d 416 (1998).
Barlow v. State, 229 Ga. App. 745, 494 S.E.2d 588 (1997).
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interviewing children and whether the interviewing techniques actually
utilized were proper."'
Barlow's conviction,
as well as the order of the court of appeals, was
21
reversed.1
In Leonard v. State,122 the State did not call its DNA expert to
testify, so defendant unsuccessfully attempted to call his own. Leonard
was convicted of malice murder in the stabbing death of a woman.
Evidence placed Leonard in a city south of Atlanta during the time
frame of the murder, and Leonard's fingerprints were found on a bloodstained beer bottle and soda bottle resting on top of the victim's kitchen
garbage. Semen samples were retrieved from the comforter on the
victim's bed, and vaginal swabbings were taken from the victim's body.
The State arranged for DNA tests to be conducted to compare those
samples
to Leonard's DNA but did not introduce the test results at
3 23
trial.
The trial court ordered that Leonard's expert be given access to
documents and the actual physical evidence of any DNA testing.
Leonard's expert did not examine any of the physical evidence. Instead
of calling the State's expert, Leonard planned to call his own expert to
testify regarding the state crime lab's DNA tests. The court granted the
State's motion to prohibit his expert's testimony because it was purely
hearsay-Leonard's expert would merely relate to the jury the conclusions of the state crime lab serologist, as recorded on his notes and
reports.2
The supreme court affirmed this ruling because Leonard's
expert, had he testified, would merely "serve as a conduit for the opinion
of others." 25
C.

Testifying Defendant

Can a defendant who testifies in his own behalf be compelled on
cross-examination to demonstrate the actions to which he testified on
direct examination?
According to the supreme court in Scott v.
State, 26 he can. Defendant was tried for malice murder in connection
with the death of a fellow inmate at the Clayton County Detention
Center. On the day in question, the victim, Castleberry, stabbed Scott
in the neck with a piece of wood. Scott tried to get away, but Castle-

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.

Barlow, 270 Ga. at 54, 507 S.E.2d at 417.
Id.
269 Ga. 867, 506 S.E.2d 853 (1998).
Id. at 868-69, 506 S.E.2d at 854-55.
Id. at 870, 506 S.E.2d at 856.
Id. at 871, 506 S.E.2d at 857.
270 Ga. 93, 507 S.E.2d 728 (1998).
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berry pursued him. Scott hit Castleberry in the face, and the piece of
wood flew out of his hands. Scott then kicked Castleberry repeatedly;
first as he tried to get up, then as he lay on the floor. When officers
arrived, Castleberry was unconscious and in a fetal position. He died
later that day from head injuries, including a fractured skull and bruises
on his27 left forehead, behind his left ear, and on the right side of his
3
face.
At trial, Scott took the stand and testified that he kicked Castleberry
in self-defense. The trial court, over objection, allowed the State on
cross-examination to have Scott demonstrate how he kicked and hit
Castleberry. 2 The supreme court affirmed the conviction and ruling,
holding that there was no violation of defendant's constitutional and
statutory right against self-incrimination.329
XII.

CLOSING ARGUMENTS

Two issues arose regarding errors predicated on closing arguments:
the propriety of what the lawyers say and the order in which they get to
make their arguments. In Luke v. State,330 the court of appeals
reversed a conviction for possession of marijuana with the intent to
distribute after the prosecutor made an improper comment during
closing argument.33 1 In closing, the prosecutor attempted to attack the
defense that Luke never possessed the drugs by arguing the law of
constructive possession.33 2 He said in part,
"If the law was that the marijuana actually had to get to the person's
hands, I wouldn't be here today. I'd be in my office working on another
case. I wouldn't be here wasting your time .... Common sense tells
you that this defense, as stated by the defendants, is crazy, and that's
all it is. Because, if that was the law, the judge would be done
dismissed33 3the case and we'd all be done gone home, because that ain't
the law."

The court of appeals held that these statements constituted reversible
error because they attempted to3 34introduce to the jury the opinion of the
trial judge on questions of fact.

327. Id. at 93, 507 S.E.2d at 729.
328.
329.
330.

Id.
Id. at 94, 507 S.E.2d at 729-30.
236 Ga. App. 543, 512 S.E.2d 39 (1999).

331. Id. at 545, 512 S.E.2d at 41.
332.

Id. at 544, 512 S.E.2d at 40.

333. Id.
334. Id. at 545, 512 S.E.2d at 40. Following Washington v. State, 80 Ga. App. 415,415,
56 S.E.2d 119, 119-20 (1949) ("if a case had not been made out against the defendant, then
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O.C.G.A. section 17-8-71 dictates the order of closing arguments in
criminal cases."3 5 In Dasher v. State,3 6 the court of appeals found
that the trial court committed reversible error by failing to follow the
mandate of this code section.3 7 Dasher and the passenger in his car,
Gammon, were tried together for the charge of possession of cocaine with
intent to distribute. The trial court ordered that if Dasher chose to
cross-examine the codefendant, Gammon, he would thereby waive his
right to open and conclude the closing argument. Dasher chose to waive
the cross-examination of Gammon but maintained his objection to the
judge's decision forcing him to choose.338
Dasher was correct. Cross-examination of a witness does not
constitute the introduction of evidence pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 17-871. 33 9 The error was harmful, moreover, because the cross-examination of Gammon would have been an important part of the defense
because both defendants claimed that the other was responsible for the
drugs in the car.34 Even had counsel chosen to engage in the crossexamination and lost the closing argument, the error would have been
harmful, declared the court.34 ' The conviction was reversed. 342
The supreme court in Massey v. State3' held that in a capital case
it is error for the trial judge to limit the defendant's closing argument to

the court could and would have directed a verdict of not guilty"); Hammond v. State, 156
Ga. 880, 883, 120 S.E. 539, 541 (1923).
335. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-71 (1997).

336. 233 Ga. App. 833, 505 S.E.2d 792 (1998).
337. Id. at 834, 505 S.E.2d at 793.
338. Id.
339. Kennebrew v. State, 267 Ga. 400, 404, 480 S.E.2d 1, 4 (1996).
340. 233 Ga. App. at 835, 505 S.E.2d at 793.
341. Id. at 834-35, 505 S.E.2d at 793. This was only the case, however, because the
evidence of Dasher's guilt was not overwhelming. Id. at 835, 505 S.E.2d at 793.
Conversely, note that in the following cases, the trial court erred in denying defendants of
their right to final closing argument, but because the evidence of their guilt was
.overwhelming," the error was deemed to be harmless: Maxwell v. State, 233 Ga. App. 419,
421-22, 503 S.E.2d 668, 671 (1998) (finding that the trial court erroneously required that
defendant tender the statements of the victims into evidence before using the prior
inconsistencies for impeachment purposes); Davis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 256, 510 S.E.2d
537 (1998) (reading five sentences of the officer's report into evidence, during impeachment
of the State's witness, should not have deprived defendant of his right to final closing
argument).
342. 233 Ga. App. at 835, 505 S.E.2d at 794. Compare Stephens v. State, 233 Ga. App.
32, 503 S.E.2d 311 (1998), in which the State conceded and the court of appeals agreed
that the trial judge erred in limiting the closing arguments in a multiple defendant case
but affirmed the conviction, holding "no correlation can be discerned between opening or
concluding closing argument and conviction or acquittal." Id. at 34, 503 S.E.2d at 313.
343. 270 Ga. 76, 508 S.E.2d 149 (1998).
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one hour.3" In addition to failing to charge the jury on the law of
circumstantial evidence, despite a written request to do so, the trial
court restricted the closing argument to one hour, in derogation of
O.C.G.A. section 17-8-73345 which allows counsel to argue for two hours
in a capital felony case. 3 4 Because "'[t]he right to make a closing
argument to the jury is an important one, and abridgement of this
right
347 the murder conviction was reversed.3 "
tolerated,'"
be
to
not
is
XIII.

JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND DELIBERATIONS

A.

Jury Charges
Failure to give a timely written request on a criminal defendant's
election not to testify is per se reversible error.3 49 Failure to give a
timely written request on the law of circumstantial evidence when the
state's case depends on both circumstantial and direct evidence35 °
constitutes reversible error.35 ' Failure to charge the jury that defendant had no duty to retreat where self-defense was the sole defense
constitutes reversible error.352
In Dunagan v. State,3 63 the supreme court reversed the murder
conviction of a teenager, finding that the trial court erred in charging
the jury, in response to their questions, whether felony murder could be
committed without intent.354 Dunagan was charged with felony
murder, the underlying felony being aggravated assault, for having shot
a gun at another teenager while they were engaged in "horseplay."3 55
Overruling all cases to the contrary, the supreme court held that the

344. Id. at 78, 508 S.E.2d at 151.
345. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-73 (1997).
346. 270 Ga. at 78, 508 S.E.2d at 151.
347. Id. (quoting Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 813, 493 S.E.2d 169, 173 (1997)).
348. Id. at 79, 508 S.E.2d at 152. Justine Hines's concurring opinion points out that
the "abridgement of the two hour time limit provided for closing argument in capital
felonies does not always demand reversal," but he agreed in this case that the presumption
of harmful error was not overcome. Id. (citing Hayes v. State, 268 Ga. 809, 493 S.E.2d 169
(1997)) (Hines, J., concurring).
349. Murphy v. State, 270 Ga. 880, 880, 515 S.E.2d 148, 148-49 (1999) (reversed
voluntary manslaughter conviction).
350. "To warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence, the proved facts shall not
only be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt, but shall exclude every other reasonable
hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused." O.C.G.A. § 24-4-6 (1995).
351. Tomko v. State, 233 Ga. App. 20, 22, 503 S.E.2d 300, 301-02 (1998).
352. Jackson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 746, 747, 516 S.E.2d 792, 794 (1999).
353. 269 Ga. 590, 502 S.E.2d 726 (1998).
354. Id. at 594-95, 502 S.E.2d at 730-31.
355. Id. at 591, 502 S.E.2d at 728.
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trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury that criminal
negligence can substitute for the criminal intent necessary to commit the
underlying felony of aggravated assault. 5 6
However, the supreme court in Parker v. State 5 7 held it is not error
for the trial judge to charge the jury that the intent necessary for the
commission of the crime of malice murder may be proven by reckless
conduct.3 55 In Parker the State requested a charge to the jury that
reckless disregard for human life may be equivalent to a specific intent
to kill. 59 The supreme court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
charge was appropriate because "[i]f a reckless disregard for human life
constitutes implied malice and implied malice is, in turn, the equivalent
of a specific intent to kill, then it necessarily follows that reckless
disregard for human life may be the equivalent of a specific intent to
kill."3 ' Three Justices concurred specially, expressing their concern
that such a charge "misleads juries into believing that malice murder
can be committed by criminal negligence."36 '
In reaffirming the inconsistent verdict rule, the court of appeals found
it necessary to overrule their previous decision in Strong v. State.362
In Kimble v. State," the jury found Kimble guilty of the armed
robbery of Jones (Count 1); not guilty of possession of a firearm during
the commission of the armed robbery of Jones (Count 2); guilty of the
armed robbery of Elkins (Count 3); guilty of possession of a firearm
during the commission of the armed robbery of Elkins (Count 4); guilty
of the kidnapping with bodily injury of Jones (Count 5); not guilty of
possession of a firearm during the commission of the kidnapping with
bodily injury of Jones (Count 6); guilty of the kidnapping of Elkins
(Count 7); and guilty of possession of a firearm during the commission
of the kidnapping of Elkins (Count 8)."6
The appellate court agreed with defendant that the verdicts were
inconsistent because all the charges arose from events that occurred
during the same period. 6 5 The court, however, having adopted in
Milam v. State31 the inconsistent verdict rule of United States v.

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.

Id. at 593, 502 S.E.2d at 730.
270 Ga. 256, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998).
Id. at 259-60, 507 S.E.2d at 747-48.
Id.
Id. at 260, 507 S.E.2d at 748.
Id. at 261, 507 S.E.2d at 749 (Hunstein, J., concurring specially).
223 Ga. App. 434, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996).
236 Ga. App. 391, 512 S.E.2d 306 (1999).
Id. at 396, 512 S.E.2d at 307.
Id. at 392, 512 S.E.2d at 307.
255 Ga. 560, 562, 341 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1986).
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Powell,367 held that the inconsistency did not require reversal of the
convictions. 38 Kimble argued that the verdicts were not merely
inconsistent, as controlled by Powell, but were instead mutually
exclusive-a situation in which Strong v. State369 should control. 7 °
The United States Supreme Court in Powell left open the manner of
handling mutually exclusive verdicts: "[niothing in this opinion is
intended to decide the proper resolution of a situation where a defendant
is convicted of two crimes, where a guilty verdict on one count logically
excludes a finding of guilt on the other."3 7' In Powell defendant was
convicted for a telephone facilitation count but was acquitted on the
predicate felonies upon which the telephone facilitation counts were
based-a classic mutually exclusive verdict situation. 72
The court of appeals in Kimble recognized that its 1996 opinion in
Strong, in which the court reversed a conviction for possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony when the jury had acquitted
on the two aggravated assaults that formed the predicate felonies for the
firearm charge,373 was incorrect because the "inconsistent verdict
issues presented in Strong and Powell [were] indistinguishable."3 74
The court, therefore, overruled Strong and affirmed the verdicts and
convictions.375
B.

Jury Deliberations
The appellate courts reversed convictions in several other cases
because of erroneous answers the trial court gave to the deliberating
juries. If an indictment specifically alleges that aggravated assault was
committed by shooting at another, it is reversible error for the trial court
to tell the jury that they may find the defendant guilty if they find that
he placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving serious
bodily injury.376 If the indictment charges a defendant with burglary,
it is reversible error for the judge to instruct the jury that the element
of unlawful entry could be established solely by proof that an accused
had the intent to commit a theft within the premises. 77

367. 469 U.S. 57, 60 (1984).
368. Kimble, 236 Ga. App. at 395-96, 512 S.E.2d at 310.
369. 223 Ga. App. 434, 477 S.E.2d 866 (1996).
370. 236 Ga. App. at 396, 512 S.E.2d at 310.
371. Powell, 469 U.S. at 69 n.8.
372. Id. at 60.
373. 223 Ga. App. at 434-35, 477 S.E.2d at 867.
374. Kimble, 236 Ga. App. at 394, 512 S.E.2d at 309.
375. Id. at 395-96, 512 S.E.2d at 309-10.
376. Elrod v. State, 238 Ga. App. 80, 83, 517 S.E.2d 805, 807-08 (1999).
377. Thompson v. State, 271 Ga. 105, 106, 519 S.E.2d 434, 435 (1999).
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In Scroggins v. State, 78 a dispute arose about the medical testimony
that had been presented during closing argument in a child molestation
case. During deliberations, the jury asked to have a transcript of the
testimony of both medical doctors. The trial court denied the request for
playback, instructing the jury, instead, that they were to recall the
testimony of the doctors from their collective memories.3 7 9 The court
of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the jury's request because the issue was one for which a serious
disagreement had arisen.80° Allowing the jury to hear the playback,
the appellate court held, "would have settled that dispute unequivocally,
while causing little, if any, harm."' l
In Wooten v. State 82 defendant sought a new trial after discovering
that the bailiff told the foreman during deliberations that a previous
trial had ended in a mistrial. The foreman informed others on the jury.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the jurors were questioned
about the effect that this information had upon their verdict. The trial
court found that the jury received this improper information, "but that
although it may have spurred the jury's efforts to reach a verdict and
caused them to scrutinize the evidence more carefully, it did not warrant
a new trial."38 3 The court of appeals affirmed, finding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial."&l
The result does not differ when the trial court, instead of the bailiff,
informs the jury that a co-indictee has pleaded guilty and has been
sentenced. 83
Compare this holding with Pinckney v. State,8 8 in
which the court reversed an armed robbery conviction because the
district attorney introduced evidence that the testifying co-indictee
pleaded guilty and was sentenced for the two-man robbery.8 7 The
court stated:
To let the jury know that Pinckney's co-indictee [pleaded] guilty is
extremely prejudicial and denies him his right to a fair trial; the only
inference to be drawn from Overton's testimony is that because his
co-indictee [pleaded] guilty, Pinckney must also be guilty, since he was

378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

237 Ga. App. 122, 514 S.E.2d 252 (1999).
Id. at 125-26, 514 S.E.2d at 255.
Id.
Id.
234 Ga. App. 451, 507 S.E.2d 202 (1999).
Id. at 453, 507 S.E.2d at 203-04.
Id., 507 S.E.2d at 204.
Horton v. State, 234 Ga. App. 478, 507 S.E.2d 221 (1998).
236 Ga. App. 74, 510 S.E.2d 923 (1999).
Id. at 74-75, 510 S.E.2d at 924.

254

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 51

apprehended at the same time and place as Overton, who admitted
being one of the two men who committed the crimes.38
In Sears v. State, 89 the supreme court affirmed a death penalty
sentence after the jury disclosed to the trial judge that they were eleven
to one in favor of the death penalty but deadlocked.3 9 The trial court
ordered them to continue working. On the third day, the foreman
repeated that they were eleven to one and that he had ordered one of the
jurors to remove the "Walkman" radio from her head and participate in
deliberations. He sent out a note informing the court that the holdout
had declared that she was unable to vote for death because the case did
not involve a murder. The foreman, therefore, requested that the court
(1) get a transcript of the jurors' answers during voir dire regarding the
death penalty, and (2) instruct the jury on the crime of perjury. At the
same time, the holdout juror sent a note to the judge asking for a charge
regarding the rights and duties of the foreperson because she felt she
was being pressured by claims of prosecution for perjury.39 '
The trial judge brought the jury in and instructed the jury that they
should recall the previous instructions as to the imposition of the death
penalty, aggravating circumstances, and mitigating evidence. The judge
told the jury that he would not read the voir dire transcript and would
not define perjury. He briefly clarified the role of the foreman and then
added several directions to the jury that all jurors should participate
fully in deliberations. Two and one-half hours later, the jury reached a
verdict sentencing Sears to39death.
The jury was polled and each juror
2
affirmed his or her verdict.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial the holdout juror testified
about the coercion she experienced and explained that the reason she
changed her verdict was that she feared being prosecuted for perjury.393 The supreme court affirmed the sentence, holding that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in its instructions and the pressure the
holdout juror felt was no greater than the "normal dynamic of jury
deliberations. 39 4
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Id. at 75, 510 S.E.2d at 924-25.
270 Ga. 834, 514 S.E.2d 426 (1999).
Id. at 835, 514 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 836-37, 514 S.E.2d at 431-32.
Id. at 837, 514 S.E.2d at 431-32.
393. Id. at 839, 514 S.E.2d at 433.
394. Id. (quoting United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381, 1383 (11th Cir. 1990)).
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SENTENCING

A.

Statutory Aggravating Circumstances
In Hughes v. State,395 the supreme court was faced with the following question: "Is it necessary for a judge to find beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance when, in a
death penalty case, a defendant enters a plea of guilty and is sentenced
to life without parole?"39 6 After the State's opening statement, Hughes
pleaded guilty to two counts of murder and was sentenced to two
concurrent life sentences without parole, thereby saving himself from the
death penalty. Hughes later filed a motion to vacate and set aside his
plea, contending that the trial court failed to make an express finding
of a statutory aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, as
required by O.C.G.A. section 17-10-32.1. 397 The supreme court agreed

and held that in the absence of an express finding of the aggravating
circumstance the sentence must be set aside and the matter remanded
for resentencing.398
B.

Serious Violent Felonies
On March 27, 1998, the Georgia Legislature responded to the 1997
decision of State v. Allmond a9 9 by amending the Code sections relating
to serious violent felonies °° and first offender sentencing4" 1 to provide that no person convicted of a serious violent felony shall be
sentenced as a first offender.
In Allmond the court of appeals held that once a defendant entered a
plea pursuant to the First Offender Act, he was not actually "convicted"
of any crime; therefore, the mandatory minimum provisions of O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-6.1(b) did not apply.4 " The court added that had the
Legislature intended some felonies to be excluded from coverage under
the First Offender Act, the statute would have clearly said so.40 3
Hence came the amendment to the statutes. During this reporting
period the main issue to face the courts was whether the amendment

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.

269 Ga. 819, 504 S.E.2d 696 (1998).
Id. at 819, 504 S.E.2d at 697.
Id. at 820, 504 S.E.2d at 697; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-32.1 (1997).
269 Ga. at 821, 504 S.E.2d at 698-99.
225 Ga. App. 509, 484 S.E.2d 306 (1997).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-6.1 (1997).
Id. § 42-8-66 (Supp. 1998).
225 Ga. App. at 509-10, 484 S.E.2d at 306-07.
Id. at 510, 484 S.E.2d at 307.

256

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51

should be applied retroactively. The court of appeals in Fleming v.
State4. 4 overruled its decision in Allmond and held that a defendant
who was convicted prior to the amendment may not be sentenced as a
first offender to any one of the serious violent felonies listed in O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-6.1(b), thereby applying the amendment retroactively.
The supreme court granted certiorari in Fleming on the issue of
whether a defendant found guilty of a serious violent felony under
O.C.G.A. section 17-10-6.1 could apply for first offender status prior to
the 1998 amendments.4 5 Although outside this reporting period, it is
important to note that the supreme court reversed the court of appeals,
406
concluding that the amendments did not apply retroactively.
Therefore, the sentence of anyone who had received first offender
treatment for a serious violent felony prior to the 1998 amendments
would be affirmed.
C. Recidivist Sentencing
The trial court's discretionary authority in sentencing has been eroded
as recidivist punishments continue to be legislated. In Mikell v.
State,4 °7 the supreme court considered the trial court's role when faced
with a crime for which two recidivist statutes apply-the general drug
offense recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. section 17-10-74o8 and the
specific provisions applicable to the crime of possession with intent to
distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project under
O.C.G.A. section 16-13-32.5(c)(2). 40 9 The State argued that the general
recidivist statute should override the more specific recidivist statute.410
The supreme court disagreed, holding that the more recent, specific
recidivist statute prevails. 411 The trial court, therefore, is authorized
under O.C.G.A. section 16-13-32.5(c)(2) to exercise discretion in
sentencing a repeat offender within the statutory range outlined in the
specific recidivist statute pertaining to the crime of possession with
intent to distribute cocaine within 1,000 feet of a public housing project,
and is not
bound by the general recidivist provisions of O.C.G.A. section
17-10-7. 4
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233 Ga. App. 483, 504 S.E.2d 542 (1998).
Fleming v. State, No. S98G1795, 1999 WL 982975 (Ga. Nov. 1, 1999).
Id. at *1.
270 Ga. 467, 510 S.E.2d 523 (1999).
O.C.G.A. § 17-10-7 (1997).
Id. § 16-13-32.5(c)(2) (1999).
270 Ga. at 468, 510 S.E.2d at 525.
Id., 510 S.E.2d at 524-25.
Id. at 468-69, 510 S.E.2d at 525.
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Compare this result with Blackwell v. State.4 13 In Blackwell the
court of appeals reviewed the trial court's sentence for the crimes of
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and trafficking in cocaine
because the sentencing court stated that it imposed the sentence
pursuant to both O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d)414 and O.C.G.A. section
17-10-7(c). 415 On appeal, Blackwell argued that the provisions of
O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) prohibit the court from sentencing him
under O.C.G.A. section 17-10-7(c).416 The appellate court disagreed,
holding that because O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) specifically provided
that "'[the provisions of subsection (a) Code Section 17-10-7 shall not
apply to a sentence imposed for a second such offense; provided,
however, that the remaining provisions of Code Section 17-10-7 shall
apply for any subsequent offense,'" the trial court "[could] not sentence
second time offenders under both O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) and
17-10-7(a), [but] it [could] sentence second time offenders under both
O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) and any remaining provisions of O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-7." 4'
D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In Williams v. State,41 8 a case involving some creative sentencing,
defendant was convicted of solicitation of sodomy and placed on twelve
months probation. The trial court imposed a special condition of
probation that defendant perform forty hours of community service by
walking the portion of the street in Athens, Georgia, where the
solicitation occurred, in four hour intervals on ten days, between 7:00
p.m. and 11:00 p.m., wearing a placard stating "BEWARE HIGH
CRIME AREA."4 19

413. 237 Ga. App. 896, 516 S.E.2d 787 (1999).
414. O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30(d) (1999) provides that anyone convicted of manufacturing, selling, or possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance as specified in
subsection (b) is guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to not less than five years nor
more than 30 years; upon a second or subsequent conviction, he shall be sentenced to not
less than 10 years nor more than 40 years.
415. Blackwell, 237 Ga. App at 897-98, 516 S.E.2d at 787-88. O.C.G.A. section
17-10-7(c) (1997) provides that anyone who has been convicted on three prior felonies must,
after being convicted of a subsequent offense, serve the maximum time provided for in his
sentence and will not be eligible for parole until he has served the maximum time.
416. 237 Ga. App. at 897, 516 S.E.2d at 787.
417. Id. at 897-98, 516 S.E.2d at 787-88.
418. 234 Ga. App. 37, 505 S.E.2d 816 (1998).
419. Id. at 38-39, 505 S.E.2d at 817.
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Defendant appealed, arguing that the sentence constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.4 21 The court of appeals approved of the sentence
and even commended the trial judge "for having the initiative to adopt
a new and creative form of sentencing which might very well have a
positive effect on Williams and be beneficial to the public."421 However, the court was constrained to vacate the sentence because the special
condition carried the likelihood of placing the probationer in danger
without providing adequate protection for him.422
E. Restitution
The Georgia Code dictates that before a sentence of restitution is
imposed, the trial court must make factual findings of the amount
pursuant to an inquiry into the factual basis for the restitution, the need
of the victim, and ability of the defendant to pay.4 3 Failure to follow
this mandate resulted in the reversal and remand of several sentences
imposing a restitution component.424
XV. APPELLATE REVIEW

A.

Preservationof Errors
Failure to preserve an objection almost always constitutes waiver,
except in a death penalty case.425 In Mullins v. State,4 26 defendant,
who was being tried for malice murder, failed to object timely to a
prosecutor's argument that had a reasonable probability of being
harmful. On appeal, defendant argued that because the argument was
improper, and likely harmful, the failure to object should not constitute
waiver.427 The supreme court held that only the supreme court has
the right to employ the reasonable probability test to allow an enumeration of error to survive, despite failure to object, when there is a
"reasonable probability" that the error was harmful, because that test
can only be employed in death penalty cases. 428 Because the court of

420. Id. at 37, 505 S.E.2d at 817.
421. Id. at 39, 505 S.E.2d at 818.
422. Id.
423. O.C.G.A. §§ 17-14-8 to -10 (1997).
424. See Britt v. State, 232 Ga. App. 780, 503 S.E.2d 653 (1998); Darden v. State, 233
Ga. App. 353, 504 S.E.2d 256 (1998); Zebley v. State, 234 Ga. App. 18, 505 S.E.2d 562
(1998); Isaac v. State, 237 Ga. App. 723, 516 S.E.2d 575 (1999).
425. Mullins v. State, 270 Ga. 450, 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999).
426. 270 Ga. 450, 511 S.E.2d 165 (1999).
427. Id. at 450-51, 511 S.E.2d at 166-67.
428. Id. at 451, 511 S.E.2d at 167.
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appeals has no jurisdiction over murder cases, all cases in which they
have applied the reasonable probability test were overruled because the
errors should have been waived if not preserved.429 Thus, Smith v.
State,43 ° Hopkins v. State,43' Geoffrion v. State,432 Bell v. State,4 33
and Wright v. State,4" 4 were overruled.433
B.

Insufficient Evidence to Convict
Several reversals resulted from a finding that the state presented
insufficient evidence to convict the defendant. In Johnson v. State,436
the supreme court reversed a conviction for felony murder of defendant's
five-month-old nephew.4 3 7 Johnson, his sister (the victim's mother),
and her boyfriend were all convicted of the murder. The child's death
occurred sometime during an evening when all three adults were in the
apartment with the child. Johnson was sleeping downstairs while his
sister and her boyfriend were upstairs with the child. At approximately
6:00 a.m. the following morning, Johnson placed a 911 call reporting
that the baby was not breathing. EMTs arrived to find the baby dead.
Medical evidence indicated he had been bludgeoned to death.438
The upstairs neighbor testified that at approximately 3:00 a.m. she
heard the baby crying, then heard a loud thump, and did not hear the
baby cry again. One hour later, she saw Johnson on the porch of the
apartment repeating "I didn't do it."439 Another neighbor saw Johnson
outside the apartment crying and saying, "They just aggravate, just
aggravate, just aggravate.""0 Johnson's sister reported that the crib
was destroyed and placed in a dumpster, but searches of dumpsters in
the area were fruitless."' This was all the evidence presented by the
State to meet their burden of proving that Johnson committed the crime
of felony murder, the predicate felony being the crime of cruelty to a
child. The supreme court concluded that the sum of this circumstantial
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209 Ga. App. 128, 433 S.E.2d 99 (1993).
Mullins, 270 Ga. at 451, 511 S.E.2d at 167.
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evidence was not sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis
except
442
that of Johnson's guilt; therefore, the conviction was reversed.
In Maxwell v. State,"' the court held that being a passenger in a car
in which hidden contraband is discovered, without more, is insufficient
to prove the passenger's constructive possession of that contraband. 4"
When contraband is found in a home in which others have equal access,
the same principle applies." 5
In Strozier v.State,"' the court of appeals reversed a conviction for
involuntary manslaughter because the only evidence linking the
defendant, Patrick Strozier, to the death of the victim was a police
officer's improper hearsay testimony that he had obtained the name
"Patrick" from an unknown source while canvassing the neighborhood
where the victim's body was found." 7
In a similar case, with an even lower standard of proof, the court of
appeals reversed a probation revocation in Overby v. State." 8 Overby
was serving a ten-year probationary sentence for a violation of the
Georgia Controlled Substances Act." 9 The State subsequently petitioned to revoke his probation, alleging a new offense of cruelty to
children and battery. At the probation revocation hearing, the only
evidence presented consisted of pictures of defendant's sister and her son
showing bruises and cuts. The responding officer testified, over a
hearsay objection, that defendant's sister told the officer that defendant
had "pushed her up against a tree."450 The victims were not subpoenaed and did not appear at the hearing. The officer reported that the
sister contacted him a few days after
the incident, reporting that she
45 1
wished to "change her statement."
The trial court revoked probation, ordering defendant to serve four
years. 452 The court of appeals reversed, finding that there was no
competent evidence to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
defendant committed the new offenses alleged in the petition to revoke
probation.453
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C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
The court addressed the tough standard of proving ineffectiveness of
trial counsel in Owens v. State.454 In Owens defendant's fianc6 hired
attorney Redding, an associate of Kendall, approximately six weeks
before Owens stood trial for the crime of malice murder and aggravated
assault. At calendar call Kendall and Redding showed up, erroneously
believing that the appearance was an arraignment. When the case was
called for trial, Kendall tried the case, though he had done no preparation for trial and had never even met his client.455
The supreme court concluded that counsel's preparation was, without
question, deficient.45 Owens argued that, under those circumstances,
it would not be necessary for him to satisfy the second Strickland457
tier of proving harm by such deficient preparation.4 5 s The court
disagreed and refused to presume prejudice because the trial lawyer had
several years experience trying felony cases and did, in fact, crossexamine witnesses and argue evidentiary issues.459 Without any
evidence that the deficient preparation resulted in errors, the supreme
court refused to presume that Owens was harmed and, therefore,
affirmed the conviction. 4 °
However, the court in Fogarty v. State461 held that if a conflict of
interest between the client and attorney is shown, it is presumed that
the client was prejudiced; therefore, actual prejudice to the defendant
need not be proven. 462 The issue before the supreme court in Fogarty
was whether a fee arrangement was contingent in nature. Fogarty's
wife paid counsel a $25,000 fee but had an agreement that if the charges
were dismissed, the fee would be reduced to $10,000. The court of
appeals held that this arrangement was an improper "quasi-contingency
fee" contract. 4' The supreme court disagreed, citing the Standards for

454. 269 Ga. 887, 506 S.E.2d 860 (1998).
455. Id. at 888, 506 S.E.2d at 861.
456. Id., 506 S.E.2d at 862.
457. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
458. 269 Ga. at 888-89, 506 S.E.2d at 862.
459. Id. at 889, 506 S.E.2d at 862.
460. Id. The court also was not persuaded by the fact that following the trial Kendall
and Redding were indicted for several felony offenses and Kendall was suspended from the
practice of law for three years for financial improprieties in his law practice. Id., 506
S.E.2d at 862-63.
461. 270 Ga. 609, 513 S.E.2d 493 (1999).
462. Id. at 611, 513 S.E.2d at 496.
463. Fogarty v. State, 231 Ga. App. 57, 59, 497 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1998).
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Criminal Justice, 4 4 holding that "[an agreement for payment of one
amount if the case is disposed of without trial and a larger amount if it
proceeds to trial is not a contingent fee but merely an attempt to relate
the fee to the time and service involved."465 Because there was no

improper fee arrangement, there arose no presumption of prejudice
resulting from counsel's representation of Fogarty.466 The conviction
was affirmed.467
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Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 4-3.3, commentary at 4-37 (2d ed., 1980).
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